RESPONSES to CRITIQUES of the Mythicist Case | |
Three: Mike Licona His review of The God Who Wasn't There by Brian Fleming Licona's critique is featured on the "Answering Infidels" website at: |
(This is a response to Licona's critique of Brian Flemming's documentary and of the mythicist case in particular, as presented in Flemming's film and his interview of myself in the DVD version of "The God Who Wasn't There". Its highlights include a defense against Licona's anti-atheist position, an examination of the "parallels" between the Jesus myth and those of the pagan savior gods, and a definitive discussion of the Hebrews 8:4 statement that Jesus was never on earth. It concludes by addressing the claim that mainstream scholarship has "time and time again" discredited the mythicist case—a myth in itself, with an Addendum of my posting on the IIDB about the recent refusal of the Fourth R, the magazine of the Jesus Seminar, to discuss the Jesus Myth theory. Licona's words appear in red, while quoted texts are in black.) * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
-- I --
It is worth noting, however, that there
is a major difference between showcasing Stalin as an example of an
atheist and [Charles] Manson as an example of a Christian. Manson acted
contrary to the teachings of Jesus. Thus, one cannot fault Jesus or
Christianity for the misdeeds of charlatans and lunatics who
misrepresent him. On the other hand, one cannot say that Stalin acted
contrary to the teachings of atheism, since atheism has no moral
teachings intrinsic to its worldview. But neither can one claim
that Stalin acted in a manner inconsistent with atheism....
First of all, it repeatedly needs to be pointed out that atheism is simply the absence of belief in something, namely a God. It is, if you like, a rejection of the existence of God on the grounds that there is no, or insufficient, evidence to support it. Certain corrollaries may arise from that rejection, but they are not inherent to atheism per se. Thus, it is entirely invalid for Licona to say that no one can claim that Stalin acted in a manner inconsistent with atheism. Or, turning that around to eliminate the double negative, it is invalid for anyone to say that Stalin acted in a manner consistent with atheism, since there is no causality involved; atheism itself is simply a rational decision made on the question of the existence of God. There is no necessary connection between such a decision and behavior of any kind, good or bad. One might as well say that driving while inebriated is consistent with owning a car, with the implication that ownership of a car is morally responsible for driving drunk. For Licona's claim to have any significance, we would have to say that owning a car gives one a disposition to drive drunk. Licona's statement that "atheism has no moral teachings intrinsic to its worldview" is both accurate on one level, and nonsense on another. The rejection of a unsupportable Deity does not, of itself, involve a moral dimension; moral teachings are not intrinsic to it. On the other hand, atheists recognize that, in the absence of longstanding religious traditions, a different basis for ethical behavior must be formulated. And most of them proceed to do so; certainly, organized or activist atheism is just as concerned with ethics as any religious body—even more so, since they must reason such things out for themselves rather than blindly accept the dictates of some petrified orthodoxy. Indeed, the requirements of living in a civilized society and preserving one's own survival and integrity within it, make it absolutely necessary. Atheists no more wish to see society degenerate into crime and chaos than religious people, and the constant accusation by the latter that we are willing to allow, or powerless to prevent, such a thing is libel of the most blind and bigoted sort. The equation of atheism with degenerate or evaporating moral standards is one imposed by the religious mentality. For such an equation to be in any way legitimate would require it to be demonstrated that atheism makes people oblivious to or incapable of producing or living by an ethical code, and this is patently not the case. The jails are not full of atheists. Marriages made in heaven are not any more secure than those made on earth. Ecclesiastical despots have been just as capable of atrocities as atheist despots, and far more capable of an irrational basis on which to be guilty of such things. The medieval and Reformation churches were capable of executing women as witches because they "knew" that Satan existed and could take over women's bodies and souls. Galileo came within a hair of losing his head because the bible clearly indicated that the sun went around the earth, regardless of what the astronomer could see through his telescope. The Inquisition was justified because Jesus had said "Compel them to come in" (Luke 14:23) and declared that the only avenue to eternal salvation was through belief in himself—and of course, it had to be correct belief. Licona speaks of a distinction between atheism and religion, but he is overlooking the most critical one. Stalin's crimes related to his political ideology, not his atheistic one. On the other hand, Christian atrocities have been a direct product of the religious stance; they were committed in the name of religion. Stalin engineered the Ukrainian famine of 1929 which killed millions because the Ukrainian peasantry resisted his communistic reforms in regard to agriculture, not because they refused to embrace atheism. He purged his army in 1937 of virtually its entire High Command because in his growing paranoia he feared they were turning against him, not because of his or their religious beliefs or lack of them. In contrast, the persecution and slaughter of the Jews throughout the Middle Ages was done, by Church and Christian population alike, on the basis of religion, and the fantasy fostered by Christian tradition that the Jews were Christ-killers. Vicious and sanguinary religious wars were fought throughout Europe on the basis of sectarian differences between Christian nations and communities over interpretations of the bible and the authority of the Pope; crusades were launched against the infidel because they failed to follow the true faith and could not be left in control of the holy places. Clearly, all these behaviors on the part of the religious community were made possible by (and were certainly consistent with) their religious beliefs; without them, they wouldn't have taken place. The same cannot be said of Stalinistic communism. The supposedly atheistic Pol Pot and his Kmer Rouge slaughtered the intelligentsia of Cambodia because he wanted to reduce the country to a radically simplistic communism; atheism played not even an incidental part. On the other hand, the ruthless ethnic cleansing of the New World (and the robbery of their gold) by the ultra-Catholic Spanish was justified by the heathen status of the conquered, making them unfit to deserve humane treatment by the soldiers and bishops of Christ. Atheism has never possessed a dictum to slaughter the unbeliever, never a philosophy to regard him or her as an infidel or inferior human, never provided a divine commandment to coerce or subjugate, to break social ties, to await a fiery judgment of the impious. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of religion, regardless of its elevated moral claims and sanctimonious view of itself. Jesus, if he existed, may have said to love one another, or one's enemies—though if he did, he was echoing those who had said it before him. But he was also reputed to have advocated compelling the non-believer to conversion, to have condemned to Hell those communities and individuals who failed to heed his message, to have urged his followers to take up the sword, and to hate one's father and mother (the repudiation of social commitments) in the interests of furthering the beliefs and goals of the sect. According to the Gospel of John, he declared the Jewish authorities to be sons of Satan. (If he also said on the cross, "Father, forgive them"—as recorded only in Luke—his words failed to provide any inspiration for centuries of Christians to follow his example.) Christians throughout history have done as much evil as good by following some of the "teachings of Jesus," and very few of them can simply be dismissed as charlatans and lunatics. Thus Licona's claim that Christians who have committed atrocities are going "contrary" to the teachings of Jesus is a sham, and can only be supported by a very selective choice of the words found in Jesus' mouth in the Gospels. Nor should we overlook the immense harm done by Jesus' healings through exorcism. It is astounding that so much investment is still placed in Jesus' miracles by Christians when so many of them embody the grossest and most primitive form of superstition one can imagine, namely the existence of demons and their imagined attacks on mental and physical health. The entire Middle Ages and even beyond suffered mightily through this portrayal of a subworld of evil spirits plaguing mankind, driving much of the lunacy and persecution Christians inflicted on themselves and others. In similar vein, the vengeful ravings of the book of Revelation, much of it involving the reputed words of a post-resurrection Jesus, has probably been responsible for more mental illness and psychotic behavior on the part of believers than any other single document ever produced. Religion breeds fanaticism, as we all know, and especially so when it uncritically surrenders itself to the words of a holy book which in great measure, Old and New, comprises the tales of the Deity's own ignorance, prejudices and atrocities. I note that Licona leaves out any reference to Hitler and the Holocaust as examples of atheistic monsters and barbarity. (He admits in an endnote, "That Hitler was an atheist is debatable.") Can it be that apologists like himself have finally gotten the message that neither Hitler nor his political system was atheistic (regardless of whether his brand of religiosity was hardly orthodox)? Hitler was not put into power by an atheistic body of voters. He was not supported and abetted in his wars and his extermination of the Jews and others by a populace of atheists. The German SS High Command could go to church on Sundays (under the benign eye of the pulpit) and return on Monday morning to their engineering of the Final Solution and the slaughter of subhuman non-Aryans throughout the conquered territories. German soldiers wore "Gott mit uns" on their uniforms, and the anti-Semitic fanaticism that drove the Holocaust was inculcated into the German people by, among other things, a reading of their own bibles. I am not the first to point all these things out, and it shouldn't be necessary to continually have to point them out, but it is not likely that the the religious or apologetic mentality will cease to make their slanderous and unsupportable appeals to the 'evils' of atheism in contrast with the righteousness of religion in general and Christianity in particular. The Question of Objectivity Licona's position is rendered even more untenable by his confusion over the concept of "objective" morality. Following on the above quote from his critique, he had this to say: ...Those atheists who still claim to
believe in objective morality simply fail to grasp the meaning of the
word "objective." By "objective," I mean that something is morally
right or wrong irrespective of the opinion of a person or society. This
is not an argument for the objectivity of morals. Rather it is to say
that if atheism is true, morals are not objective. The only standards
are those set by individuals or societies. People can choose to abide
by those standards or endure the consequences imposed by the society in
which they live if they are caught breaking those standards.
Individuals can vary significantly in their moral standards. But in a
godless reality, no one is obligated to abide by the moral values of
another individual....
What does it mean to say that something is "objective"? While the standard definition goes something like, "not influenced by personal feeling or prejudice," the word refers to the nature of our judgment about something, how knowledge about it is arrived at. This judgment and knowledge is considered independent of any individual's opinion or bias, and it is verifiable through some common, acceptable standard which is also independent of anyone's individual—or "subjective"—opinion or bias. Geometry is objective because it is provable by logic and demonstration, based on axioms that everyone can see are correct. Scientific conclusions can be arrived at in the laboratory or any field of critical investigation because we use devices and methods which can be examined for their reliability, and which moreover can give us the same results each time, predictable on the basis of previous observation and experiment. The laws of nature and the scientific method generally prove consistent, regardless of the beholder. But where are the devices and methods for proving the objectivity, reliability and permanence of anyone's moral code? They don't exist, at least in a scientific sense. Licona says, "By 'objective,' I mean that something is morally right or wrong irrespective of the opinion of a person or society." But how do we recognize a moral code as conforming to this principle? It cannot be proven by mathematical demonstration; it cannot be supported in the laboratory. "Right and wrong" have to be arrived at by someone's moral standard, by someone's judgment. Of course, we all know Licona's answer. They are arrived at by God. The proper moral code is "objective" because God has declared it. That is Licona's definition of "objective"—a self-serving travesty of the word. Because, of course, this kind of objectivity is anything but free of the opinion of a person or society. First of all, he would not accept the declaration of a Hindu god as objective, or the ancient Amon-Re of Egypt, or the gods of Easter Island. And I don't think he would regard the moral compass of Osama bin Laden as the "objective" Koran. So his definition of "objective" becomes even more narrowly focused: "the declarations of the God of the Jews and Christians as found in the Bible." Hardly a universal standard, verifiable by devices and methods which can prove their divine source, their reliability and permanence to all people at all times. Indeed, Licona has to rely on faith that the bible represents the word and wishes of an existent God, which is about as far from objectivity as one can get. If appeal is made to the idea that the reasoning mind can see the 'obvious' valid nature of such commands as "thou shalt not kill" or "thou shalt not steal," then we don't need the bible or God himself to declare them to be so. Atheists thus become as capable as anyone of arriving at and adopting moral standards on a reasoning basis. If, on the other hand, we cannot rely on them through our own rational processes to be valid and worthy of following, if God has not derived these laws from principles that lie outside or independent of himself, then it becomes a question of God's arbitrary whim as to what he is going to make right and wrong; this is also anything but "objective." Indeed, moral laws in this case become entirely subjective—on the part of God himself. If there are no truly objective and independent moral standards adoptable through our own reasoning processes, then we live in a pretty scary universe. This does not mean that the physical universe itself embodies such moral standards, as though "written in the stars." It does not. But to the extent that we ourselves, the human brain and its capacities, are the universe's product through evolution, any moral standards we arrive at on our own through rational judgment as to what is desirable and beneficial (and thus "good") for our own welfare and progress become "objective"—as objective as anything of a non-physical nature can be. Licona's morality is on even shakier ground if he is going to claim that the process by which he thinks to know God's wishes is in any way reliable or objective. For, of course, the voice of God does not speak to us directly. We have no verifiable knowledge of what God wants. All we know is what some unknown writers, priests and prophets wanted, allegedly speaking as the voice of the God of the Hebrews, some 2500 to 3000 years ago. (The same goes for the 'record' of the alleged teachings of Jesus.) Those writers lived in a scientifically and intellectually primitive and—certainly by our standards—unenlightened age, which is not to say that they may not have managed to get a few basic things 'right.' Licona complains that without God, the only standards are those set by individuals or societies, but in the absence of God's own voice, the standards are being set precisely by "individuals and societies" who claim that they are the ones who know how to interpret such and such a piece of ancient writing—and such societies (read religious sects) have universally demonstrated an abysmal lack of rationality, objectivity, tolerance and compassion, not to mention concern for issues like human rights. If the only standard available is the God of the written bible, what are we to make of all the truly objectionable and clearly subjective (not to mention contradictory) things we find in that conglomeration of documents, things which would offend the sensibilities of many people today, both believers and atheists? Various passages in the Old Testament give us God's own exemplary directives to slaughter one's enemies, including women, children and the foetus in the womb, usually for the purpose of gaining more lebensraum. Destroying all life except for one family and a pair of each species hardly bespeaks mercy and self-control. But no better example exists of the difficulties involved in arriving at a biblical morality than the various elements found in the Book of Leviticus. We can start with the passage quoted probably more often than any other in the Old Testament by modern fundamentalists (which speaks volumes in itself): the rabid condemnation of homosexuality in 18:22. Yet how can we accept this as the eternal word of God and "objective" morality in the face of modern medical science and psychology which has identified the gay expression as inherent in nature, including human nature? It is not an aberration (even if due to chance pre-natal factors), but a naturally occurring phenomenon in a minority of the population. Does God not recognize this in his own creation? Apparently not. God apparently has some other strange and subjective ideas as well, at least to our modern minds. Leviticus 18:19 forbids sexual relations during a woman's menstruation. Why isn't that piece of objective morality championed by fundamentalists with equal adamance? 19:13 declares it a law of God that the employer "not keep back a hired man's wages until the next morning." Should the religious community not be agitating for daily paychecks? In 19:19, we are forbidden by God's objective morality to "put on a garment woven with two kinds of material." Where are the evangelical protest marches against the makers of polyester or acrylic and wool sweaters? As for the bulk of Leviticus' priestly concerns, it is apparently an objective requirement of God that animals be sacrificed to him in a unending stream of blood and smoke. If the Lord has changed his mind on that particular predilection, or outgrown such primitive needs, how does this differ from the great bugaboo of "moral relativism"? How can we label God's laws as anything but subjective and lacking in permanence? By any standard, Licona's "objectivity" has evaporated into the wind. He speaks of the "obligation" to act morally. If that obligation is not determined by rational judgment and our own acquired wisdom, by the need to craft and maintain a safe and civilized society and create the greatest happiness and well-being for as many as possible, then we are simply acting like puppets, surrendering our own intellects and moral instincts, terrified of the whims and reprisals of an irresponsible God. If all that is really left of Licona's championing of traditional biblical ethics is the fear of horrific punishment to keep us in line, this does nothing to develop humanity's own wisdom or sense of self-worth, it hones no abilities to be intrinsically moral or to perceive the reasons and advantages to developing that capacity. Atheism very much requires and prompts the development of a moral code; it is one of those "corrollaries" I spoke of attendant upon the rejection of the existence of God. And if God's own example in the bible is anything to judge by, it will achieve a far greater degree of objectivity, rationality and permanence than anything the religious mind has yet produced. The ability to create and apply a moral code is, if nothing else, a survival mechanism, and evolution has proven itself extremely capable of producing such things. * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * *
-- II --
The Gospels and Paul Licona starts by addressing the
claim, as stated by Flemming, that there is a gap of at least 40 years,
probably more, between Jesus' alleged life and the recording of that
life in the Gospels, and that all of the later Gospels essentially
derive from Mark. He declares this "far
from the truth." But what makes
the truth "far" from this statement? He says, Although it is granted by most scholars
that Matthew and Luke used Mark as one of their sources, they had other
sources as well. The hypothetical "Q" source which Doherty acknowledges
may be one of those sources. Luke reported that many had written
accounts of what Jesus said and did before he wrote his Gospel (Luke
1:1).... Considering that Licona points out in
a
endnote that "a number of scholars
are now questioning whether Q
existed," it would seem he is offering such a source (which I do believe existed) only
tentatively, and nowhere in his critique does he further address Q or
its content to see how well it might provide us with a secure source
for Jesus, particularly in the area of biography rather than simply
imputed sayings. His use of Luke's Prologue is rather naive, in that he
fails to consider the possibility that this is a later addition,
especially as prior to the Gospels known as Matthew and Luke, we
possess no document outlining anything pertaining to the Gospel story
other than the Gospel of Mark. This should lead to suspicion about the
early authenticity of the Prologue, with its statement that "many
writers have undertaken to draw up an account of the events that have
happened among us..." This, along with the next words, "...following
the traditions handed down to us by the original eyewitnesses,"
suggests both the passage of time and points to a period, such as well
into the second century, when "many writer's accounts" would indeed
have been available. I would also take the opportunity to point out
that the writer of the Prologue makes no mention of his own identity,
or any personal link to important figures involved in Christianity's
beginnings. This omission severely weakens the claim that
the author of this Gospel is Luke, companion of Paul, since such an
author
would have had every reason to identify himself in light of what he is
saying in the Prologue itself. And in the case that this is a later
editor's addition to an existing Gospel of Luke, it also indicates that
at the time of such editing, there was no circulating tradition that
"Luke" had been its author, else the editor would certainly have made
such an identification. Licona goes on: Regarding
John's use of Mark, the prominent New Testament scholar Larry Hurtado
writes that "probably
most (but by no means all) scholars nowadays hold that the author(s) of
John (at least at the earliest stage of the process that led to our
present text) either did not know of, and refer to, any of the Synoptic
Gospels or, at the least, did not use them as sources in the way the
authors of Matthew and Luke used Mark (and Q)." Moreover, most of today's scholars
believe that much of the tradition in John is from one of Jesus'
disciples, although there is no consensus about who that disciple was.
Many believe the author was the apostle John or a minor disciple who
traveled with Jesus but was not one of the twelve. I do not know Larry Furtado
first-hand
(though I'll have more to say about his reported views later), but he
at least betrays some liberal elements in regard to John in the above
quote, which is in marked contrast to Licona's own follow-up statement.
As I said earlier, Licona has a habit of appealing to "most of today's
scholars" when he is really referring to the most conservative
circles
among them. Other than his appeal (to be discussed later) to
various scholars and historians who have rejected the idea that Jesus
never existed, the most 'critical' scholar he draws on seems to be the
late Raymond E. Brown, and although Brown commands well-merited
respect, he is anything but a liberal. Most of Licona's authorities are
at the level of Craig Blomberg, whom he cites in an endnote here as
supporting the "Johannine authorship" (that is, the apostle John, son
of Zebedee) of the Fourth Gospel. There is hardly a "critical" scholar
today worthy of that description who would state this with any degree
of confidence, or even countenance it at all. And none of them would go
so far as to consider that the content of John, especially the
teachings, was the product of eyewitness or the authentic voice of
Jesus. The type of authority Licona relies on rises no higher into
the critical stratosphere than those interviewed by Lee Strobel in
his The Case for Christ, and
I am not the only one to point out the ultra-conservative nature of
Strobel's body of New Testament scholars. Licona goes on to make a completely
unsupportable statement: Some details in John (e.g., Jesus'
arrest & trial) actually cohere better with known historical
conditions and are not related to John's theology... If there is one thing critical
scholars are agreed upon, it is that John's content is almost
entirely determined by theological considerations. Prominent among
these is the equation of Jesus with the paschal lamb, his
identification of him as such. To that end, he has changed the very day
of the crucifixion from that of the Synoptics so that Jesus' death on
the cross coincides with the slaughter of the lambs in the Temple on
Passover eve, rather than the first day of Passover itself. Paschal
Lamb imagery is used throughout the entire Gospel, and features of the
story and the teachings placed in Jesus' mouth are altered to fit such
theological interests. He introduces, alone among all the evangelists,
the piercing of Jesus' side by the Roman soldier in order to conform to
a perceived prophecy that "no bone [of the
lamb] shall be broken." I am not sure what Licona has in mind in his
reference to details particularly in John's arrest and trial as
"coher[ing] to known historical
conditions," but it is precisely events
in those final scenes of Jesus' life as presented by John which lead
critical scholars to see Johannine dependence on the synoptics. He
fashions the basic structure of the whole business just as they do, and
it is telling that he employs the same literary structure
of "intercalation" first introduced by Mark (it is one of Mark's common
fingerprints) in the denial by Peter scene. After Jesus' arrest, Peter
is brought into the High Priest's courtyard to set up the scene, then
both authors cut away to the scene of Jesus' questioning by the
Sanhedrin, then come back to complete the scene of Peter's denial.
(Luke is the one evangelist who does not bother to follow Mark's lead
here.) John also introduces a number of "fine-tuning" elements over the
Synoptic precedents: he further clarifies the role of Joseph of
Arimathea and the burial of Jesus; he introduces Jesus' mother to the
crucifixion itself where no other record does so; he gives us an entire
philosophical discussion between Jesus and Pilate where the other
evangelists have Jesus saying almost nothing (in keeping with other
biblical 'prophecies'). It is hardly likely that John would be privy to
all these fuller traditions, sometimes in contradiction to the other
Gospels, while the remaining evangelists were not; rather they make
best sense as his own amendments and additions in keeping with his own
purposes. (Those changes involve the astonishing elimination of the
establishment of the Eucharist at the final meal, and the complete
excision of Gethsemane!) The dramatic difference between Jesus'
teachings in John and those of the rest of the Gospels is inexplicable
unless the former are simply the product of the Johannine community,
imposed on the synoptic story line. None of this gives us any
confidence that John is working either from history, or independently
of the synoptic writers. Conservative scholarship is rightly perplexed
as to who in Jesus' circles could possibly have been "witness" to such
divergence in tradition, and we can see the figure of the "beloved
disciple" as an invention of the author of John to provide his
community with its own link back to Jesus himself. Flemming's whole point, and my own,
is that if there is so much evidence of literary connection between the
various evangelists, with all of the essentials (especially the
biographical ones) going back to a single original author, namely Mark,
the historicity of any of it is thrown into serious doubt. If none of
the elements of the story can be found in the wider non-Gospel
documents of the first century (we can talk about Acts later), if there
is no trace
of the wealth of diverse traditions about Jesus and his
life—not just the Gospel way of
presenting them—which ought to have
been saturating the Christian communities of the time, the actuality of
a
Jesus
of Nazareth as portrayed in the Gospels rests on very shaky ground.
Again, there is nothing "hyper" about this skepticism. It is a simple
and natural proposition justified
by the record itself. For Johannine dependence on the
Synoptics, I recommend Robert Price's The
Incredible Shrinking Son of Man. Many of the points he makes
relating to this can be found in my review
of that book on this website. Price's observations ought to resolve the
"no consensus" (Robert Funk, Honest
to Jesus, p.239) situation among scholars in regard to the
source of John's passion story. Licona objects to my "radical" dating
of the Gospels: an 85-90 approximation for Mark and the rest by around
125. This is certainly not radical by the standards of truly radical
scholarship (which is a wide phenomenon today, and not just among Jesus
mythicists) in regard to dating. Licona points to the view of "nearly
all modern scholars" as holding to the traditional dating of
Mark
around
70 and the rest by the end of the century. But that's just what it is:
a scholarly tradition, virtually a bandwagon effect. It is based on
very little, and is open to
contention as much as any other opinion in this field. It is certainly
not
based on attestation, since clear attestation of any of the Gospels
does not exist much before the middle of the second century. The
'early-as-possible' dating of the P52 fragment of John is self-serving
and cannot be guaranteed before 150. Critical scholars such as Helmut
Koester acknowledge that Gospel-sounding elements in turn-of-century
writings like the Didache or the letters of Ignatius are more likely to
come from oral tradition and not written Gospels, and there is other
evidence in such writings to indicate that their authors do not know any written Gospel. Dating the Gospel of Mark to 70 or
shortly after is based almost entirely on Jesus' apocalyptic prediction
of the Temple's destruction in Mark 13 and its versions in the other
Synoptics. But I have pointed out indicators in the passage itself
which suggest otherwise, including Jesus' own words which seem to be
formulated to
allow for some time to have passed after
the destruction of the Temple. Many of the conditions alluded to are
compatible, sometimes better so, with my later date than the
traditional one. These arguments are laid out in The
Jesus Puzzle, p.194-5,
and I won't detail them here. Licona makes an appeal to our
reliance on the histories of many famous figures in the ancient world
having been written far longer after the lives of those figures than
the Gospels were written after Jesus, even assuming a later dating than
the traditional one. This is a common argument, but basically
irrelevant. We have to examine each individual case on its own merits,
as to the reliability of the writers, our knowledge about them and
their circumstances, the nature of their writings. There is no
comparison between sober-minded historians like Diodorus, Plutarch and
Arrian writing on Alexander the Great and four unknown authors
recounting a miracle-working man-god forecasting the end of the world
who redact and contradict each other while writing on an otherwise
unattested
human figure—much less the Son of God—some three-quarters of a century after the 'fact'. In answer to Flemming's
statement that the letters of Paul are virtually all we have of the
history of Christianity beween Jesus and the Gospels, Licona points to
Acts: The book of Acts is usually dated to
have been written between AD 61-85. Even if we date Acts on the outer
end, we have a document that is a history of the Church between AD
30-61. That is,
it was written only 25-55 years after the events it purports to
describe, given the outer limits of a critical dating. The year 85 is hardly the
limit of the critical dating of Acts. Several scholars (John Knox,
Burton Mack, J. C. O'Neill, J. T. Townsend) place it well into the
second century, and I have presented arguments in The Jesus
Puzzle (p.269-71) for regarding it as the product of the
Roman church to counter 'heretical' views, especially about Paul,
during the
Marcionite period. As in the case of the Gospels, the early dating of
Acts is hardly based on attestation. There is none for this document
before the year 170. That such an account of the early Church could
have existed for a century and be drawn on by not a single Christian
writer is simply inconceivable. As for some of the arguments apologists
make
for dating Acts to 62, prior to Paul's death since no mention is made
of it, I'll quote from my response to Lee Strobel in Challenging the Verdict
(p.18-19) as an example of a type of common sense thinking that needs
to be brought more often to the claims made in this field: Well, I have to say,
Dr.
Blomberg, that this is a pretty shaky line of deduction, since it’s
based on a
very uncertain starting premise. There could be any number of reasons
why the
author of Acts chose to end his book where he did. For example, it has
been
suggested that Acts’ plot line is symbolic of the faith’s early
expansion from
Jerusalem to Rome, from a Jewish beginning to a gentile culmination, so
the
author may well have wanted to avoid ending on a negative note. That
symbolic
progression would have been somewhat compromised by having Paul get his
head
chopped off. Licona refers to the "early kerygma"
involving stories of an historical Jesus, but this is simply an
appeal to Acts. We have no secure reason for dating Acts so early, or
for relying on it to contain accurate historical information. Since
there are obvious tendential features of Acts' portrayal (as in Paul
cooperating entirely with the Jerusalem apostles, in clear
contradiction to his own letters), since dramatic elements like the
Pentecost experience and the martyrdom of Stephen are nowhere to be
found in the rest of the early Christian record, since all the speeches
are from
the same authorial hand and lack virtually all of the high Christology
found in the early epistles, and for many other reasons, Acts
must be rejected as providing anything that can be reliably used to
verify
claims about the early nature of Christianity or an historical Jesus. Besides relying on the unreliable,
Licona is not above arguing using various fallacious mechanisms, one of
which is begging the question. Contrary to Flemming, there are a
number of reasons for believing that Paul was familiar with the
historical Jesus. First, since Paul was a committed Jew, he would have
been in Jerusalem during the Passover as Jesus would have been. Thus,
there is a good possibility that both Jesus and Paul were in Jerusalem
at the same time and that Paul even heard Jesus teach. Second, Paul
declares that he opposed the Church to the point of persecuting its
believers. Acts reports that Paul had heard the testimony of Stephen
about Jesus just before Stephen was martyred. And surely others, both
the persecuted and the persecutors, would have shared information about
the historical Jesus with Paul. This happens so often, and not only
from Licona, that one really has to assume that such debaters do not
understand the principle of begging the question. Flemming has made the
statement that "Paul doesn't believe that Jesus was ever a human being.
He's not even aware of the idea." He bases this on the fact (or claim,
if you like, since it can be—and has been—challenged) that within the catalogue of Paul's
own words we receive no statement or indication that Paul regards Jesus
as someone who was a recent human being on earth. In other words, this
is a
conclusion, accurate or otherwise, drawn first-hand from the primary
evidence itself. To 'disprove' this, Licona points to various
considerations which amount to begging the question: that is, he draws
alleged deductions from other
ideas which entail the assumption
itself of the very issue in question. That is, in answer to the statement
that Paul's words present no knowledge of an historical Jesus, Licona
says that Paul was likely in Jerusalem at Passover and could thus have
bumped into Jesus at the time of the events surrounding the passion.
There is, of course, no statement or evidence anywhere that this
actually happened, but this assumes the existence of Jesus and his
presence in Jerusalem at the time of an historically true Gospel story.
Licona is using this assumption (which is the question under debate) to
help 'disprove' that very question as stated by Flemming. It is even
more blatant and obvious when Licona argues that Flemming's statement
is wrong, that Paul would have known about an historical Jesus, because
certain people would have shared
information about the historical Jesus with Paul! The latter is
again, an assumption, based on nothing evidentiary. While Flemming's
statement is based on direct evidence, that is, the interpretation of
Paul's
words and silence in the epistles, Licona thinks to counter that with a
presumption, not only not
based on any direct evidence (since no one
records, including Paul himself, that he was told by anyone about an
historical Jesus), but on something that relies on Flemming's statement
being a priori
wrong. He is
trying to prove something wrong by essentially stating it as being
wrong. That's
begging the question, a blatant case of it, and it's a logical fallacy.
Too many people like Licona can't recognize that, and we'll see more
examples of it as we go along. (Bishop Spong, despite being an
intelligent and critical scholar, was guilty of precisely this kind of
question begging in recent correspondence: see my response to Gordon in Reader Feedback
25.) If Flemming had simply stated that
Paul would have had no chance to know, or know about, an historical
Jesus, then Licona's arguments would have been legitimate. They would
simply have provided arguments for that "chance to know." They do not
provide counter evidence for the deduction drawn from Paul's letters
that he in fact did not know or know of an historical Jesus. Licona goes on: Third, Paul wrote: "We have known
Christ according to the flesh" (2 Corinthians 5:16). This seems to
imply that he had some knowledge of Jesus' earthly life. This is a perennial favorite,
but as certain
translations (like the NEB, which translates kata sarka as "worldly standards")
and certain scholars (like C. K. Barrett, see his Second Epistle to the Corinthians,
p.170, as detailed in endnote 14 of The
Jesus Puzzle) have shown, the "according to the flesh" modifies
"have known" and not "Christ." It describes the disposition of the
believers, not the nature of Christ. Fourth, on three occasions in Paul's
letters he shows that he is familiar with the sayings of Jesus (1 Cor
7:10; 9:14; 11:1, 2, 20-25).... What Licona is not familiar
with is mainstream scholarship's concept of "words of the Lord," the
practice of Christian prophets like Paul declaring that they have
received and are delivering pronouncements of Christ from heaven (in
the same way that "John" receives and passes on the words of Jesus in
the book of Revelation). Licona's "sayings of Jesus" as delivered by
Paul fall naturally into that category, especially as he never speaks
of Jesus as a human teacher, and seems ignorant of teachings far more
important than the paltry directives about divorce and reimbursing
apostles. (See also The Jesus Puzzle,
p.29-30 for other indicators of this interpretation.) In 1 Thess. 4:9
he declares that the one who has taught us to love one another is God
himself, not Jesus. As for 1 Corinthians 11:23f, we will revisit that
later, but Paul's declaration in verse 23 that he got this information
"from the Lord himself" indicates he is speaking of a personal
revelation from Jesus to him, and not anything known through historical
tradition. Sixth, Paul reports that he went to
Jerusalem to visit Peter. The word he uses for visit in Greek is historēsai, from which we derive the English word
history. Thus, as many scholars have noted, during Paul's first visit
with the apostles as a new believer, he is certain to have asked them
for details about the Lord he now served, details of both his earthly
life and his teachings, the same information each of us would be
interested in if we were now in Paul's place.... "He is certain to have asked
them..." More question-begging of the sort discussed above. And
if Paul
is "certain" to have been interested in such details, why do they never
appear in his letters? If his listeners and converts were certain to
have been equally interested, why does he never give them any, even in
situations were such references would be pertinent? I have no doubt
that, in some other context, Licona has equally argued that Paul
doesn't mention such details because he wasn't interested in them,
which is a
common 'explanation' for Paul's silence found throughout apologetic,
and even mainstream, debate on this point. As for historēsai, Licona is drawing a
page from Lee Strobel, his interview of Gary Habermas in The Case for Christ (p.229). I'll
reply as I did in Challenging
the Verdict (p.196):
The problem is, Dr.
Habermas, that you have given a debatable interpretation even of this
single
word. You’ll note that even the NIV, the translation I just gave of the
Galatians verse, does not bear you out. There, historeo
is rendered in its usual meaning, that Paul is simply
going to Jerusalem to “get acquainted with” Peter, not to investigate
him or
anything else. Bauer’s Lexicon defines the verb this way: “To visit for
the
purpose of coming to know someone or something.” The Analytical Greek
Lexicon
gives: “to visit in order to become acquainted with,” and points to
Galatians
1:18. Since Peter is in the accusative case, this makes him the object
of the
‘visit for acquaintance.’ If this were a formal investigative inquiry,
as you
put it, one might expect the object quoted would be Jesus, the
doctrine, the
creed, the tradition, or whatever. Licona's other few points
involve a "may indicate"
and a "could have been" and
(in a quote from
Paul Barnett) even a "There can be
no doubt that..." Unfortunately,
this is the sort of argumentation that the anti-mythicist position too
often is forced to have recourse to, unbacked by any evidence. In the matter of the Lord's
Supper, Licona says that Flemming's claim that Paul "never quotes
anything
that Jesus is supposed to have said," is easily debunked, pointing to 1
Corinthians 11:24. "Paul is
obviously aware of the Jesus tradition known by the Evangelists (Mark
14:22; Matt 26:26; Luke 22:19)." As I pointed out, it is
anything but obvious, since Paul says he got these words "from the Lord
himself." Paul would hardly make such a claim of personal revelation
if such words and traditions were circulating in oral transmission
based on knowledge of an historical event. He'd look like a bit of an
ass. (The perennial apologetic argument based on apo vs. para has been shown to be invalid,
as in practice these two prepositions were interchangeable.) Once this
is realized, we have to ask is this Paul's perceived revelation about a
mythical event, along the
lines of the sacred meals of other savior-god cults? We might also ask
whether the Gospel rendition of this meal and these words are
ultimately based on such a mythical tradition, whether from Paul or
some other source. Paul is familiar with Pilate and John
the Baptist in his speech in Acts 13:25,28.... But
only if we can depend on
Acts being reliable as history, which I have shown we cannot, much less
that this or that speech in it represents words actually spoken by the
person into whose mouth they have been put. There is
certainly no mention of either of these figures in Paul's own letters—or in any other non-Gospel writing of the
first century. (They do occur for the first time in Ignatius in
the early second century; and Pilate is given passing mention in 1
Timothy 6:13, which is one reason why conservatives are very anxious to
try to discredit the mainstream judgment that the Pastorals are second
century forgeries written in Paul's name. And no critical scholar would
agree with Colin Hemer who Licona reports "argues that the speeches in
Acts are probably summaries of what certain apostles taught on a
specific occasion." "Probably" means wishful thinking, since
there is no evidence that such is the case.) As for another
perennial bone of contention, Galatians 1:19 with its reference to
James as "the brother of the Lord," this has been done to death. While
Flemming does not in his DVD, I have certainly provided much in the way
of evidence and argument to support the thesis that the word "brother"
does not refer to a sibling here, but to a believer and follower of
Christ, which is the way the word is consistently used throughout the
epistles as applied to all sorts of people. (See my Response to Gerry in Reader Feedback 22.)
It naturally does not fit well, as Licona points out, with the Gospel
'report' that Jesus had brothers, including a James, but the latter
evidence cannot be used to determine the meaning in the epistles, since
this is the very issue under contention: what does Paul's reference in
Galatians mean, if there is no evidence from him or his contemporaries,
and much against it, that their "James" was the sibling of a human
Jesus? The Gospel linkage could very well be based on traditions of a
group of apostles, and their leader, who were called by this term many
decades earlier, now misunderstood or simply adapted to the new story.
Then there is always the possibility that the phrase began as a
marginal gloss by some later scribe, to identify the James Paul had
spoken of according to that scribe's understanding. (On 1 Timothy 6:13,
see also the Appendix to my Article No. 3: Who
Crucified Jesus?) Comparing Jesus to the
Mystery Cult Deities Licona gives us an excerpt
from Flemming's DVD interview with Robert Price, in which Price
compares an actual historical figure like Caesar Augustus around whom
legends collected but who is securely locked into history, and Jesus,
so many of whose stories cannot be so locked but are instead
scripturally derived or are outrageously improbable. Licona answers
this in a somewhat haphazard fashion, and I will simply comment on a
few of his points here. Price has referred to Herod's slaughter of the
innocents (in the Matthew nativity story), and while Licona declines to
offer a detailed refutation of the denial of such an event, it is clear
that he accepts it as historical, which identifies where he stands on
the 'critical' spectrum. Moreover, he then goes on to provide one
defense of sorts, appealing to Lee Strobel's rationalization for why
the event does not appear in Josephus or anywhere else, namely that,
well, Bethelehem was a small place and Herod's action would only have
involved a few infants in a small village in an unpopular section of
the Roman Empire and would it really have caught the attention of a
number of ancient historians? As I said in response to Strobel,
Bethlehem was only six miles from Jerusalem, which is hardly backwater.
Would Josephus (is he an historian for whom Judea would have been
unpopular?), who meticulously recorded the atrocities of Herod's rule,
have regarded such a barbarous act, despite the alleged small numbers
involved, as unimportant to mention? Licona further offers, "we should
not be surprised if only one source reports it, in this case Matthew."
I don't know why not. Matthew was not an historian, let alone a
contemporary, and the incident is part of a passage which seeks to give
Jesus a wondrous birth account; the slaughter element is clearly a
reworking of an
identical biblical precedent pertaining to Moses (as well as of
non-biblical similar legends attached to other ancient rulers like
Sargon). For Licona to defend it as historical is little short of
ludicrous. We might well ask if he finds it unsurprising that only one
source, namely Matthew, records the entire business of the visitation
of the magi, the slaughter, the flight into Egypt, while another
Christian source, namely Luke, has a nativity tale that entirely lacks
such things and has its own incidents based on scriptural inspiration? Licona makes a brief foray
into the field of conservative scholarship's regular attempt to
discredit the ties between Jesus and the mystery deities. Martin Hengel
is quoted as pointing out how pagan gods who died violent deaths
differed from Christian reports about Jesus, and that crucified gods
"can be tormented for a while, but can never die." One part of this
position seems to contradict the other; and Hengel cannot be referring
to Osiris, Attis or Adonis, among others, who definitely died, in quite
bloody fashion. The appeal to Hengel is further garbled (whether due to
Hengel or simply Licona himself) by going on to mention
"Greek heroes" who cannot be allowed to suffer a painful and shameful
death like crucifixion, but are rescued at the last minute. This is
mixing, or confusing, savior-god mythology with Hellenistic romance
plots, and neither serves to demonstrate that Jesus could not belong to
either or both categories as portrayed by the Gospel writers. Nor does
it discredit the point Price is making, that so much of what is
attributed to Jesus is fundamentally of a mythical or fictional cast,
and historically improbable in nature. Licona refers to the
oft-claimed difference between the Gospels and the savior-god myths,
namely that the resurrection of Jesus is not
reported to have taken place in the gray and distant past. Rather, it
was linked (1) to the time of Tiberius and Pilate, (2) to a specific
location: Jerusalem within Judea, and (3) to numerous eyewitnesses who
were still alive, including Jesus' own family members. That the Jesus
of whom Paul spoke is a contemporary rather than a mythic figure from
an unspecified time in the past could not have been any clearer. By now, I don't need to point
out that this is more question begging. Licona's three points are
precisely what we do not find
in Paul, who never links Jesus' death to any specific time or location
(without us lassoing 1 Timothy into Paul's corral), whose
"eyewitnesses" are simply to visionary experiences (like his own) of a
scripturally-revealed dying and rising savior—but that's a
matter in regard to 1 Corinthians 15 which I won't go into here. It is
the Gospels, and the Gospels alone during the first century, that make
such a placement in time and location, and if the traditional myths of
the mysteries are placed in a primordial past, it is because they were
of ancient provenance, whereas Christ belief of the Pauline sort was of
recent vintage. When it eventually became historicized in the Gospels,
Mark would have had no reason to set his savior in a distant past. It
would have been very reasonable to tie him to more recent history,
especially as this would have coincided with the time of the earliest,
by now legendary, apostles of the Christ like Peter and Paul. It would
still have been sufficiently displaced by time and war so as not to
interfere with any question of veracity or verifiability—if indeed
Mark was concerned over such things. If his original tale was meant
only as allegory, or a fictional rendition of someone he might possibly
have regarded as historical, then he would not have been. Too many of
the arguments made by those who would discredit the commonality between
the Christian and pagan versions of intermediary Son religious
philosophy ironically do not take into account the fact that there are unique factors involved in the
Christian manifestation, but that these differences do not have to
spell any fundamental difference in historical quality between the two
expressions. In that regard, I will jump
ahead in Licona's critique to deal further with the mystery deities. In
a section he calls "Parallelmania" Licona engages in several pages of
rebuttal to the common observation that many of the elements in the
myths of the pagan savior gods find close parallel in the story of
Jesus. Now, the whole question of these parallels is certainly a thorny
one. The scholarly work of finding such correspondences between Jesus
and figures like Osiris, Adonis, Tammuz, etc., is an old one, beginning
in the late 1700s. Its heyday was in the 19th and early 20th century
and to some extent it has fallen into disrepute; certainly no
major scholars over the last half century have undertaken a significant
review of the primary sources on which such parallels were based. Those
primary sources are also part of the problem. As I said in my book review of Tom Harpur's The Pagan Christ: Modern
skeptics of the field of
comparative religion, with its claims of close correspondence between
the elements of the Jesus story and a multitude of precurors in the
mystery and salvation religions of the era, may have a case of sorts to
make when they dismiss such parallels as being often unclear,
exaggerated or unfounded. The primary sources for such things are a
wide and uncoordinated array of texts and fragments of texts,
artifacts, frescoes, uncertain records of oral traditions and rituals,
excavated temples and places of worship (some ruined by
Christian depredations), many requiring interpretation and a careful
gleaning of their significance. There have no doubt been parallels
suggested, or even declared with confidence, between Jesus and this or
that 'savior god' in ancient cultures, which rest on shaky ground or
have turned out to be erroneous. Christian apologists are ever
at pains to point out these uncertainties and errors. But a few
overstated claims and an inevitable degree of ambiguity where some
features are concerned does not destroy the entire case, and serves
only
to provide some handy red herrings for determined apologists. The
overall picture is not significantly compromised and is indeed beyond
question. There are enough common features between Jesus and antecedent
savior figures and their mythologies to make the principle valid. The
story of Jesus is not
original, much less historical. It owes its life blood—and many of the moles on its skin—to
mythical motifs and far more ancient ideas that are found not only
throughout the Near East but literally around the world, often in
cultures that had no direct contact with those now familiar to us,
making such expression endemic (some might say 'epidemic') to the human
mind.... Again, Licona
claims that "most scholars"
have abandoned the History of Religions
School that regarded parallels as conclusive sign that Christianity was
cut from the same cloth as ancient myth. Well, it's not a case of
having "abandoned" it so much as making a concerted effort to discredit
it, for reasons that are quite obvious. Orthodox scholars have long
recognized the danger presented in the picture of a Christian genesis
out of pagan salvation religion, and have done their best to squelch
it. I have encountered no better debunking of this very biased (and
even dishonest) campaign than that of Robert Price in his Deconstructing Jesus. As I say in
my website review of that book: Jonathan
Z. Smith ("Dying and Rising Gods" in Encyclopedia
of Religion) and Gunter Wagner (Pauline Baptism and the Pagan
Mysteries)
are only two of many offenders who have naively or arrogantly twisted,
misread and misrepresented the Greek mysteries and Pauline Christianity
in order to divorce Jesus from his fellow cultic saviors: Dionysos,
Attis,
Osiris & Co. No one can read these pages [88-91] and ever again
allow
such special pleading tactics any credence. Licona appeals
to several timeworn arguments against the principle of parallels: Further research has revealed that many
of the parallels to which they [the
History of Religions school] refer
postdate the Gospels. Thus, it is most likely that those parallels were
the result of other religions who copied the Christian story rather
than the other way around. Second, no examples cited exhibit all of the
points we find in the Gospels. Hence a number of the parallel accounts
must be combined in order to mirror Jesus. Third, no miracle-worker per
se existed within two hundred years on either side of Jesus. Fourth,
many of the parallels cited are weak. Fifth, parallels can be seen in
just about anything... I wish I had a
dollar for every time an apologist rattled off this claim that much in
the mysteries postdates Christianity and this makes borrowing possible
in the other direction. The only accurate aspect of it is that some of the existing evidence for
what was contained in the mysteries comes from the second century, a
little of it from later centuries, but this does not mean that such
features necessarily began
only at that later time. There is precious little writing per se about
the mysteries (not the least because it was officially forbidden), and
what did find its way onto paper comes mostly from the CE period. But
no dispassionate analyst is going to maintain that such things did not
go back into earlier times. Such earlier evidence tends to be of the
sort I mentioned in the Harpur book review, artifacts, frescoes,
fragmentary texts, or the writings of ancient historians, playwrights,
etc., who happen to deal with related subjects, and so on. That gods
like Tammuz, Adonis, Dionysus, Osiris had myths which contained many of
the same features as we find in the story of Jesus is simply
undeniable. This is not to say that myths and cults of these gods would
not have undergone some evolution over time; no religion stays static
indefinitely, and that includes Christianity over its
first few centuries. And there is always a certain amount of
syncreticism going on, and that too includes Christianity in its
formative processes. But to simply dismiss the common elements between
Christianity and the pagan mystery religions as a case of direct
borrowing from the former by the latter from the second century on is
apologetic nonsense. First of all,
we have the witness of a writer like Celsus, around 160-180, whom
Origen did his best to refute. He accused the Christians of having
nothing new, of borrowing or stealing everything
from the widespread myths of the time. Then we have Christianity's own
apologists like
Justin and Tertullian being forced to deal with such
accusations, not by denying that the mysteries had possessed such
features before Christianity came along, but by admitting that while
they did predate Christ, they were the responsibility of Satan and his
demons who counterfeited them ahead of time. (We laugh at such
rationalizations today, but some modern apologetic antics aren't much
better.) Licona actually undertakes to address Justin's remarks, which
I will address shortly. Some
of
Licona's above-quoted rebuttal involves a common device among
apologists. Find and play up any differences one can find, subject the
material to minute dissection to see where exact comparisons are
lacking, and then claim that this is decisive and disproves the entire
case. (As the saying goes, "If it's not an exact parallel, it isn't a
parallel.") This, too, is nonsense. No one is claiming that the story
of
Jesus is a mirror image of every aspect of savior god mythology, and
certainly not of any one particular god's mythology. Rather, what we
see is a commonality of themes and basic ideas, not all of which are
universally shared. Christianity emerged from a broad cultural segment
of the ancient world, with Jewish elements of one form or another as a
prime component. Judaism itself was not monolithic (as Richard Carrier
has laid out concisely in his article "The Spiritual Body of Christ" in
The Empty Tomb, which Licona
addresses in his critique), and some Jewish circles outside Judea were
significantly hellenized. The degree of commonality of themes and
elements, including specifics, between Jesus and the pagan myths is
extensive, even striking; they are enough to justify the conclusion
that in many
respects they are indeed cut from the same cloth. Licona notes
some of the parallels that Flemming "drops" on his viewers, including, Stars Appeared at Their Birth...Healed
the Sick; Cast out Demons; Performed
Miracles...Betrayed for 30 Pieces of Silver; Celebrated Communal Meal
with Bread and Wine; Which Represented the Savior's Flesh and
Blood...Resurrected on Third Day; Ascended into Heaven... Licona claims
that "no evidence is provided to
show that these stories have a dating
any earlier than 100 years after Jesus," and a little later he
claims
that
regarding resurrection, "the first
clear parallel does not appear until
long after the life of Jesus, probably Adonis around AD 150." In
the
above list, I would allow that "Betrayed for 30 Pieces of Silver"
probably
represents one of those poorly supported, and too-close parallels with
a
specific Jesus feature, but the rest can hardly be denied as widespread
mythemes of the ancient world, variously applying to gods, heroes or
"divine men." As for Adonis himself, Everett Ferguson (Backgrounds of Early Christianity,
p.239) notes: "the Adonis myth perhaps most clearly indicates the
resuscitation of a god, but even here it is not strictly a
resurrection. These beliefs are more closely allied to the cycle of
nature, and the mysteries seem to have had their origin in the
agricultural cycle." Ferguson also notes (p.221) that more specific
reference to a "resurrection" of Adonis does indeed come from the
second century, but probably under the influence of the Egyptian cult
of Osiris, not Christianity. Licona himself
gives us a quote from Justin's Dialogue
with Trypho which directly refers to Bacchus (Dionysus) "being
torn in pieces, and having died, he rose again, and ascended to
heaven," as well as to Hercules who "ascended to heaven when he died."
Justin is being forced to address the parallel nature of Greek
traditions like these to those of the Christians, and as we noted, he
put it down to the work of evil demons. Licona, of course, has another
explanation: the pagans stole from the Christians. But Justin wrote in
the middle of the second century. Are
we to believe that when Justin noted those parallels, the entries were
not
yet dry in the mystery cults' books concerning such resurrections
and ascensions, having just been appropriated by these ancient cults
from the newcomer Christianity, not to mention all the other details
and parallels Licona and others suggest pagan religion "copied" from
the Christian story? The idea is ridiculous. The Christians
themselves seem barely familiar with their own traditions, if we are to
judge by the fact that almost nobody before Justin shows any knowledge
of the Gospel events and the features of Jesus' life, that Justin is
the very first to quote from those Gospels, and almost the first to
equate the Son and
Logos with a man who had recently lived. Before the time of Justin,
pagan writers, satirists and
historians have barely taken notice of Christians, let alone of an
historical Jesus, and most second century
apologists seem to have felt secure in presenting a "complete" picture
of the Christian faith without even mentioning him. And yet all these
ancient
cults suddenly felt it necessary or desirable to adopt features of the
Jesus story in wholesale fashion? Preposterous. This is how I
put it in my "cross-examination" of Gregory Boyd in Challenging the Verdict
(p.89-90):
Licona also
treats us to the spectacle of himself attempting to discredit Justin's
own discussion of the parallels. He calls them "weak," pointing out the
differences, for example, between the resurrection of the sons of
Jupiter with that of Jesus, since the manner in which they "rise" from
a state of death, and the circumstances involved, are quite different.
Of course they are. They arise from different cultures, their stories
have totally different settings, much of the underlying philosophies
are quite different. But Justin was able to recognize what Licona
refuses to: that the essence of the theme is the same; both are
different expressions of the same basic idea. Licona would no doubt
argue that the tradition of the Star at Jesus birth is completely
unlike the tradition of a comet at Julius Caesar's birth because one is
a star and the other is a comet. That may be a bit of an exaggeration
on my part, but let me make my point by quoting Robert Price in Deconstructing Jesus (p.89): Smith's
error is the same as that of Raymond Brown, who dismisses the truckload
of comparative religion parallels to the miraculous birth of Jesus.
This one is not strictly speaking a virgin birth, since the god
fathered the child on a married woman. That one involved physical
intercourse with the deity, not overshadowing by the Holy Spirit, and
so on. But, we have to ask, how close does a parallel have to be to
count as a parallel? Does the divine mother have to be named Mary? Does
the divine child have to be named Jesus? Here is the old "difference
without a distinction" fallacy. Just
because I
choose to plant roses and you choose to plant geraniums, or because our
two backyard soils may have different ingredients which favor one or
the other, does not mean that they are not both flowers and gardens, or
that we
have not indulged our green thumbs through common motives and impulses.
We both come up with the basic idea under the influence of a
traditional practice throughout our urban society; our own garden's
layout may even be at least partially the result of viewing our
neighbors' gardens and being influenced by what we see. There are
naturally inevitable differences in origins and cultural influences
between the
pagan salvation mythology and that of
Christianity. The mysteries are ancient because their roots go back
into prehistory and are dependent on the agricultural cycle of
yearly death and rebirth. The myths of the savior gods symbolized these
processes and guaranteed rebirth in an afterlife for the initiate. And that
afterlife, as Greek philosophy progressed, became the survival of the
soul or spirit only, not the body. In contrast, Christianity was not
directly rooted in the agricultural cycle, and the Jewish presence in
Christianity introduced an element of physical resurrection (anathema
to the Greeks). This too, however, underwent a progression from
a "spiritual body" (Paul said that flesh and blood couldn't enter the
kingdom of heaven) to a raising of the body in flesh, reflected in a
similar progression for Christ, as early thought about Christ raised in
spirit was supplanted by the Gospels' portraying him raised in flesh.
Christianity also had a particular focus on sin and its forgiveness,
which the pagan cults scarcely shared, so Christ's features were
adapted to those interests. Because of divergent factors like these, it
is entirely unrealistic to look for lockstep parallels. But as Justin
recognized, they did have common themes, and often common details for
those themes, if only because there are only so many ways the human
mind, and sectarian circumstance, will translate those themes into
specific traditions and linkages with the god or founder. Baptism is a
universally 'cleansing' rite, in one way or another. At a 'sacred meal'
what else are the devotees to do but eat and drink, and it is
inevitable that these things will be given a sacred significance,
usually traced to the god and attributed to him in a mythical
inaugurating ceremony. Great men's births must be accompanied by some
portent; and their careers will be opposed by those, god or man, whom
such careers will threaten. The features of those careers will tend to
follow common patterns, whether relating to miracles, disciples or
conflicts with others. And they will usually meet some unpleasant fate,
with that experience embodied in story lines which have universal
elements to them. And so on. Our brains tend to operate along
similar lines in much of what they come up with, no matter what the
variety of culture and specific interests we may have; parallels and
similarities are what we should expect to find, and the various
expressions of them will feed off each other. But for one of those
religious expressions to claim that its version of things has nothing
to do with any of the others, but just happens to be historical reality
while the rest are mere myth, is myopia in the extreme. In the case of
Christianity, when we also see that its particular translation of the
mythemes are in conformity with specific passages in the scriptures,
the claim to historical reality becomes naive in the extreme. Licona spends
a few pages engaging in a dubious exercise we've all seen before.
Coincidental parallels are noted between ancient Rome and the United
States, between Jesus and John F. Kennedy, between Abraham Lincoln and
Kennedy. But Licona is comparing apples to oranges. Let's take the case
of Lincoln and JFK. Here are a few of the parallels: - both were
elected president in the same year of their respective centuries
(1860/1960)
- both were shot in the head - both had successors who were named Johnson - the names of both assassins are comprised of fifteen letters And so on. No
one would doubt that these are coincidences, pure and simple, not the
least because we know that both men were historical. Licona is
facetiously suggesting that, if we followed the lead of Jesus
mythicists, an historian a couple of centuries hence might conclude
that JFK was a myth, created to embody a 20th century version of
Abraham Lincoln. Similarly, in the case of coincidences between Jesus
and JFK, future historians might conclude JFK was a myth to embody
Christian theology in the 20th century; and likewise, the history of
the United States, being coincidentally similar to Rome's, would be a
myth to parallel the Roman Empire. But in the
first and third cases, Rome and Abraham Lincoln are historical
entities. We know that. That's a given. In each case, Licona is
suggesting that someone, or some later group, would create a myth (or
interpret something as such) modelled on an historical precedent. What
would lead a future historian to do that is not clear; if the archetype
is historical, why would the antitype be mythological? In any event,
this is entirely
opposite to the case of Jesus. The precedents to the Jesus story are
mythical. We more or less
understand how the myths of Osiris, Mithras,
Dionysos, etc., were formed and evolved, and we can recognize the
characteristic features of mythical figures and stories. They have
characteristics which are peculiar to mythical figures. If we find
striking similarities in those features attributed to Jesus, we are led
to place him in the same
category, not in the opposite one. Without a priori assuming that Jesus is an
historical figure (which is the issue under debate, a 'fact' for which
there is so little reliable evidence that such a debate is possible) we
would interpret such data about Jesus as placing him in the mythical
category. It makes little sense to suggest that if the data about JFK
bore a strong parallel to the data of a figure who was regarded as
historical, that anyone would place him in the opposite category. If it
be retorted that the very number of parallels would lead someone to
think that this commonality had to be an artificial one, thus making
the later one an alleged invention, this is shot down by the fact that
we do see (as Licona has shown us) that such coincidences can exist
between two known historical
figures, and therefore there would be no necessity or impulse to see
either one of them as artificial. A major factor
becomes the nature of the data being paralleled. There is a great
difference between the data in the JFK/Lincoln case and the data in the
Jesus/savior gods case. Each of the features attributed to Jesus and
the other deities we can identify as serving a purpose, and they all
form part of a coherent whole within the framework of mythical
expression. The same is not true of the data in regard to JFK and
Lincoln. None of the elements show any purpose at all, neither for
elevating status nor casting some significance on the lives of the
figures. They are purely random, and unrelated to each other. There is
a big difference between
being born in a given year and being born of a virgin. The latter has
theological significance whereas the former does not. In the case of
Lincoln and JFK, one year would be as good as another. As I said,
Licona suggests in theory that some future historian
could interpret the coincidences of birth years, or similar names of
Lincoln's and JFK's successors, etc., as indicating that the later
example of JFK was deliberately formulated to create a parallel with
Lincoln. JFK might become mythologized on the basis of such parallels,
as supposedly an historical Jesus is suffering today at the hands of
those who would turn him into a myth. But the ridicule element in this
is only made possible by the fact that we know JFK is not a myth. If we stood a few
centuries hence, and could find little evidence in the historical
record that a reputed JFK actually lived, if he was a religious figure
all of whose features had mythical significances, and were shared by
other figures we knew to be
mythical, then there would be nothing ridiculous about such a reasoning
process. It wouldn't prove that we were necessarily right about JFK
being mythical, but it would present a strong probability, especially
when weighed with other indicators. Parallels
between Lincoln and JFK are obvious coincidences. That's the whole
point of making this comparison, and the assumption that they are coincidences is necessary to
make the exercise meaningful. When we turn to Jesus it is not obvious
that these are coincidences; they would need to be argued as such, and
that is a difficult thing to do, and certainly Licona does not do so.
To simply declare that they are, in order to make the parallel
legitimate between the two cases, is once again to beg the question. In
fact, it would be almost impossible to make the case that the parallels
between Jesus and the savior gods can be put down to coincidence. That
a set of multiple circumstances relating to birth, events surrounding
that birth, upbringing, career, death burial and resurrection, would
happen solely by chance to coincide with sets of themes and even some
minute features found in savior god mythology, Hellenistic romance
novels, and scriptural passages, and yet nonetheless be historical—even if some
of those features in regard to the mystery deities are set aside as
overenthusiastic—strains the
bounds of credibility. Licona makes
the statement that no miracle-worker per se existed within 200 years on
either side of Jesus, and a little later, that I speak of "would-be
messiahs and miracle workers that plagued Palestine throughout the
first century." But here he is putting words in my mouth. I am not
saying that any of these figures were declared to be, or declared
themselves to be (as far as we can tell) "The Messiah." But Josephus
tells us of a number of figures who acted messiah-like, and even
promised messiah-like results. Judas the Galilean began the zealot
movement, promising his countrymen freedom from Rome. Theudas, toward
the middle of the century, promised the miracle of dividing the river
Jordan so that his followers could cross over. There was also an
unnamed Egyptian who claimed that his command, like Joshua's trumpet,
would
knock down the walls of Jerusalem. When someone gathers forces around
him, challenges the Roman authorities and promises miracles will happen
in the overthrow of Israel's subjugators, that's a would-be messiah. He
would certainly be so in the popular mind. As for the
zealot
leaders who provoked the War and the downfall of the nation, they can
hardly
be denied delusions of messiahship. In
all these cases, if it looks, talks and walks like a duck, it probably
thinks
it's a duck. Licona,
quoting Twelftree,
acknowledges that there are figures who "perform a single miracle or
two during their lifetime, but they are not to be compared to Jesus."
But this is short-sighted on a number of counts. With one major
exception, we don't have an account of a miracle-worker's career
comparable to the Gospels, though we have surviving traditions about
this or that individual performing reputed miracles in general, such as
certain Jewish rabbis. We also have testimony to the widespread practice of magic and
miracle-working, even if no surviving names are attached to it. (For
statements in principle on this, see for example Burton Mack, Myth of Innocence, p.209.) And
when we offer that one exception, namely Apollonius of Tyana, whose
reputed miracle-working rivalled the reputed miracles of Jesus, what
does Licona do? He imputes that it was all made up by Apollonius'
biographer Philostratus over a century later! As if there would have
been no traditions of miracle-working going back to, or near to,
Apollonius' career which Philostratus could have drawn on. No, he made
up the whole idea himself, and moreover, did it all in imitation of
Jesus of Nazareth. We are not allowed to 'win' on any count, no matter
how unlikely the argument that has to be put forward. Actually, the
tradition that Jesus (even if historical) worked all those miracles is
on no more secure ground than the traditions about Philostratus. Not a
single Christian writer of the first century outside the Gospels so
much as mentions miracles by their Jesus, a subject often
conspicuous by its absence. To find the first reference to
Jesus being a miracle-worker one has to go beyond even Ignatius to the
epistle of Barnabas, and even he fails to give any examples. When we
also consider that miracle working was expected to accompany the
approach of the Kingdom, when we consider that most of the miracles in
the
Gospels are midrashically modelled on miracles stories of the Old
Testament, we have reason to believe that nothing goes back to any
recorded
historical miracle-working (genuine or not) by Jesus. In fact,
believers and apologists are faced with a dilemma. If miracle-working
was such a rarity, and yet Jesus of Nazareth uniquely performed—or was
reputed to have performed—all or even
some of these wondrous deeds, how can it be that not only contemporary
Christian writers are silent on them, they created no stir which would
impel non-Christian commentators of the time to make any mention of
them either? Licona says he
is "not attempting to split hairs"
in regard to the resurrection of
Romulus. "Resurrection" meant that the corpse
that had died was returned to life and transformed into an immortal
body. If we view every story of a post-mortem appearance as a parallel
to Jesus, then we have to include every ghost story and grief
hallucination, from past to present. But not only
is he indeed splitting hairs, he is cutting them according to his own
rules and definitions, namely the Christian ones. "Resurrection"
may mean the above to Christians (with a leaning toward the way Paul
expresses things, rather than the Gospels), but the mysteries had their
own concepts of resurrection, what constituted their own equivalent. If
Greeks believed only in the survival of the spirit into an afterlife,
then a physical resurrection to earth for the god—in any form
of body—would not
have formed a part of their thinking. But the effect for them would
have been essentially the same; both would have conferred the same
benefit. As long as the god overcame death in some way which invested
him with some power that could be transferred to the initiate, the
theme was the same. In imagining that a spiritual Christ in the
spiritual realm had been killed and rose from death, Paul was simply
creating or supporting a variant of the mystery cult theme. When the
Gospels put forward the idea that he had lived and died on earth and
rose
on earth in flesh, the theme was carried a step further toward
the literal. This does not change its fundamental nature as another
expression of a universal mytheme. Licona
dismisses the case of Asclepius, "raiser
of the dead and healer of all
diseases," as a pertinent parallel to Jesus, even though he was
slain
by another god. Why? Apparently because the story of Asclepius "occurs
in the foggy past with no marks of historicity." But that's not
the
point. The Gospels, for their own reasons and circumstances, place an
historical Jesus in
recent history, whereas the pagan traditions, being more ancient, did
not. But given that new setting, we see the Gospel story as following
the themes of the Asclepius story. That
is what is significant. Despite Licona's denial, it is "a strong parallel to Jesus,"
and Robert Price's use of it is not a "very poor" example; just as many
post-mortem appearances to gods or heroes are legitimate parallels to the
post-resurrection stories in the Gospels, since all serve the same
purposes. It is ironic that Licona belittles such parallels, saying
that
"we would have to include every
ghost story and grief hallucination
from past to present," when there is no evidence in Paul that
the
visionary experiencing of the risen Christ was anything but that: the
conviction that they had seen the spiritual Jesus, an entirely
spiritual entity, or "ghost" if you like. And even if we were to assume
an historical,
crucified Jesus, such visions could very well have been a "grief
hallucination." Before we go on, I should mention that I was taken aback by a little detail in this section of Licona's critique. In offering one of the Psalms, he says "The psalmist David is writing poetically..." David?? Does Licona actually support the ancient fantasy that the Psalms were written by David? This would place him so far beyond the low end of the critical spectrum he would disappear from sight. Doherty and the Jesus
Myth In his section
"Flemming Interviews Earl Doherty," Licona seems to have difficulty
getting a handle on the material, and his rebuttal is ill-organized; to
some points there is no rebuttal at all to speak of. To my reported
statement that Matthew, Luke and John rework Mark in ways that show
they had no concern about preserving 'history' in their sources," or
that "Paul never places Jesus' death and resurrection in an historical
setting," Licona can only muster [I]t is not uncommon for scholars to
see all sorts of interpretations about what biblical authors really
meant, rather than what seems plain on the surface. In this area,
I too have "creative skills."
I hope that Licona realizes that this
sort of thing is not a counter argument to what are very important
considerations in the record. Similarly, to an argument that threatens
to turn the Gospels upside-down... Of the story of Jesus' multiplying of
the loaves and fishes, [Doherty] writes: "These are direct reworkings
of the miracles of Elijah and Elisha." Doherty thinks of the New
Testament as Midrash, a new way of seeing spiritual truth. He claims
that the Evangelists went to the Old Testament and created a Jesus
based on certain Old Testament passages. Thus, they were using Old
Testament passages to create the story. ...his
rebuttal is extremely weak: Most scholars see things differently.
They recognize that the New Testament writers attempted to make sense
of Jesus by going back to the Old Testament to see what it may have
said about him. Midrash was an attempt to take old stories and make
them relevant to the people of the writer's own time and culture. But
we can note that those writing the midrash believed the stories they
were adding to. And just how
do we "recognize" and "note" such things? Licona does not say. Is there
the slightest account in Paul or any other epistle writer which tells
of this great exercise reputed to have been undertaken by the simple
fishermen apostles around Jesus to examine the scriptures, along with
much sophisticated Greek philosophy besides, and interpret their late
Master according to it all? The first century breathes not a word of
it. This is one of the great rationalizations of the last two centuries
of New Testament scholarship, that all the high christology of the
epistles, from
Colossians' great Logos-type hymn of the cosmic Son (1:15-20) to
Hebrews' High Priest who performs a sacrifice in heaven, is all "an
interpretation of Jesus of Nazareth," despite the fact that nowhere in
any of it is this christology identified with such a man. They all
present a Son of God along various interpretive lines, but they never
equate him with the Jesus of the Gospels. As I've said elsewhere, Paul
believes in a Son of God, not
that anyone was the Son of
God. Licona speaks
of the writers believing in the stories "they were adding to."
His
language here is woolly, and what else is there but stories? Where is
the material based on historical memory as distinct from ingredients
that are in direct parallel with scripture, and thus bearing every sign
of being drawn from it? Why would apostles who went to scripture to
make sense of their dead Master have created a story simply out of
scriptural elements, with no input from their own memories to fashion
the tale? Since around 1980, mainstream critical
scholarship has identified virtually every single element of the
passion story as dependent on scripture, both for fine details and
overall story line. As Crossan has put it, there is nothing left to
represent "history remembered." (Robert Price has shown that this is
also largely true of the ministry portions of the Gospels.) And where
is the great variety of oral
tradition about the events of Jesus' death which should have been
circulating, imposing itself on the evangelists' accounts? What is it
that the evangelists still believed in? The simple existence of the man
in question? That's possible, but it eradicates any factuality in the
stories being told of him. And where in the non-Gospel record is there
any indication of the great controversy that should have arisen over
such factuality? Did no one notice that so much of the tradition being
told of Jesus was scripture-derived? What did the convert make of the
dichotomy between history and midrash? The issue never arises. Indeed,
the entire question of Jesus' historical words and deeds never
arises, since no one makes any mention of them, certainly not Paul who
never offers a single earthly detail about the great dying and rising
of his savior, and tells the poor Thessalonians that it is God who has
taught them to love one another. Licona makes a
half-hearted attempt to appeal to the reliability of "a number of
ancient non-Christian sources [who] mention a historical Jesus,"
and
says that I will no doubt claim them all as interpolations. I don't
need to. The so-called mentions by Pliny the Younger and Suetonius make
no clear reference at all to an historical man; in the latter it is not
even clear that he is speaking about Christians. The "majority of
scholars" may today hold that some sort of authentic reference
to Jesus
was made by Josephus, but this was not always so. Early in the 20th
century, the majority tendency was to reject it all as unlikely to be
authentic. (Charles Guignebert is representative when he says, "It
seems probable that Josephus did not name Jesus anywhere" [Jesus, p.18].) The modern trend to
claim a residue of the "Testimonium" in the Antiquities of the Jews 18 as
original is as much a bandwagon effect as anything, and there are so
many
difficulties and contradictory arguments in regard to this as to render
any conclusion totally uncertain. Apologists just don't understand this
point. The existence of Jesus does not, and cannot, stand or fall on
Josephus. All the mythicist case needs to demonstrate is that the
references in Josephus are unreliable,
and this has been done. The case for either side must rest elsewhere,
and for the mythicist case it does. (I
was vastly amused at Licona's appeal to "today's leading Josephus
scholar Louis Feldman." The fact that I've never heard of
Feldman may
not mean anything, but what does this "leading" scholar say to support
the authenticity of the second Josephan reference to Jesus? Licona
quotes him: "The passage about
James [Antiquities Book 20, Sections
197-200] has generally been accepted as authentic." Apparently
this
"authority" on the subject is basing his opinion on the appeal to other authorities, who "generally"
accept the passage. Talk about inbred 'evidence'!) As for
Tacitus, all Licona can
offer is that it is unlikely that a Roman historian
such as Tacitus who had no respect for Christians would rely on their
reports about Jesus for his own writing of history. Well, not
every scholar would agree with him. Norman Perrin (The New Testament: An Introduction,
p.405) thinks this is exactly where Tacitus got his information. And
considering that Tacitus' gives us the barest facts about "Christus,
the founder of the sect," which does not even include a reputed
resurrection, would indicate a lack of research from any source. And yes, there are good
arguments for postulating an interpolation here, though on balance I
tend to hold to authenticity. In answer to
my point that there is no evidence in the early record that any of the
apostles were actually martyred (a concept absolutely dear to the
hearts of apologists for an historical Jesus), Licona's response is not
much more than, "But this seems
unlikely." He appeals to the speeches
in Acts as though these represent reliable traditions about what Paul
did and said, backing this up with the declaration that "few believe
that the content of the speeches was invented by Luke,"
a statement
that is simply untrue where critical scholars are concerned. (And just
where and how would the individual words, or even the subject matter,
of given apostles' speeches made across half the empire at least
decades earlier, have survived in 'tradition' to be drawn on by the
writer of Acts—be
reasonable!) Licona
makes the mistake of appealing to 1 Clement as evidence that Paul was
martyred, since he overlooks an even more important point. Yes, this
epistle, in chapter 5, seems to suggest that Paul ended his life in
martyrdom, though it is obscurely stated. However, what is blatantly
missing is any suggestion that such a martyrdom took place in Rome,
something a Roman author would hardly have left out if any such
tradition existed. Since I regard 1 Clement as basically authentic in
regard to general dating and to being what it makes itself out to be
(and Licona would hardly side with more radical views here),
this is strong evidence that around the turn of the second century, the
tradition had not yet developed that Paul had gone to Rome and been
martyred there. So much for the reliability of Acts as representing
history. A
Christian Document
Without Christ Licona lays
out my case regarding Q: Doherty believes there was a Q
community that did not believe in the death and resurrection of Jesus.
The Jesus in Q is not considered a Savior figure, but bears a strong
resemblance to the Greek [C]ynics of the period. Doherty
thinks the
documentary record shows that today's Christianity is a combination of
the Christianities of both the Q community and Paul and that this
combination took place in the Gospel of Mark. It is not a mix of oral
tradition that Mark has tied together. In response he
says, In Larry Hurtado's recent work on
Christology...he interacts with John Kloppenborg's work on Q.
Kloppenborg seems to agree with Doherty
that Q's failure to note any
passion narratives or redemptive interpretations of the death of Jesus
indicates that Q does not know them. But Hurtado points out that it is
"not credible to imagine these Q people as somehow remaining ignorant,
while all about them interpretations of Jesus' death as redemptive, and
believe in Jesus' resurrection as well, were circulating among the
followers of Jesus." Paul is clear that what he preaches is essentially
in agreement with what was coming out of Jerusalem (Galatians 2:1-10)... There is a
wealth of revelation about the apologist mentality coming out of these
few sentences, along with what follows. It shows that as long as
students of the New Testament are blinded by the old paradigms, they
will never be able to grasp the essence of the mythicist case or
properly perceive the course of early Christian development. Once
again, we have a case here of begging the question in the sense I
discussed, and Hurtado is as guilty of it as Licona. A
reconstructed Q—and it's a
reconstruction that has been going on for a
century and a half with a great degree of reliability having been
achieved by now—indicates
quite clearly that no death and
resurrection, no salvific role for Jesus (other than being identified
with the Son of Man), is in sight in that document. This is something
that would be almost inconceivable for a community which was
a part of the early Christian movement as envisioned by orthodoxy.
Instead of an opening of the mind to see if there is another way,
another scenario within which such a void could make sense, people like
Hurtado simply appeal to the assumption that it was all part of a
larger whole which would require that
the Q people would know of those missing features, regardless of
whether they are in evidence or not. That, as I said earlier, is
begging the
question. As a counter to arguments based on evidence, Hurtado is
appealing
to arguments (his claim that something is "not credible") which are not based on evidence, but on
assumptions that need to be supported. One of those
assumptions is that there was
a connection between the Q community, its faith and practice, and the
community of the cultic Christ of which Paul was a part. Since the
record in regard to both gives every indication that there was no
connection between them, since they are lacking every essential common
element, this is the more compelling conclusion to draw, regardless of
what orthodoxy has made of it or how disturbing it might be. Yes, there
were in the outside world (to Q) faiths that involved an interpretation
of the death of a Jesus as redemptive; that these were entirely
different faiths to what the Q community was about, is something that
would never occur—and never be
allowed to occur—to Hurtado or
Licona. It would never occur to them that the Jesus whom "followers"
like Paul believed in was entirely different from the Jesus (if there
originally was one in Q, or if that is what he was called) associated
with the sayings and
miracle-working of the Q community. And yet that is precisely what a
dispassionate study of the evidence would indicate. Paul does say that he and the Jerusalem
apostles are preaching essentially the same thing, but there is nothing
in Q that ties it to any Jerusalem group or the city itself. Perhaps
Hurtado hasn't noticed that Q contains no mention of specific apostles,
let alone any Peter, Paul or John from the Pauline side of things. (No
doubt he would claim that they have
to know such figures.) Licona
postulates a couple of options to explain why the Q document did not
mention the death and resurrection of Jesus. First, it could be that, for reasons
unknown to us, Matthew and Luke preferred to use other sources when it
came to these stories. Second, it could be that Q was composed during
the lifetime of Jesus. In this case, we would not expect passion and
resurrection narratives. His first
option is conjecture; on top of that, it is unlikely. If Matthew
and Luke possessed a document containing not only a rich
source of sayings and miracles, but material associated with the trial,
crucifixion and resurrection, why ignore the latter content completely?
What
are the odds that both of them would do so? Their only other source
seems to have been Mark, and of course, scripture. If there were
sayings and anecdotes in Q relating to Jesus' experiences in Jerusalem,
why not draw on that to supplement the Markan and scriptural use? But
it is not only the death and resurrection. If Q was intimately tied to
the entire world of Jesus worship, why is there no mention of its Jesus
as the Messiah (the Son of Man is something distinctly different), why
is there no equivalent to the Gospel sayings of Jesus relating to his
role as savior, as the coming Son of Man, as one destined to undergo
death
and rising? These are topics the Gospels intimately associate with
Jesus' ministry, yet they too are missing in Q. None of the linkages on
which Hurtado bases his assumptions can be found anywhere in that
reconstructed document. The latter
observations help discredit Licona's second option. Even to suggest
that Q could have been compiled during Jesus' lifetime, or rather
during the latter part of a one-year ministry (which is all the window
one could allow), is to ignore all critical scholarship and
common-sense understanding of the document itself. There are clear
signs of development within Q. The seams are there, the incompatible
elements that indicate evolution. Certain sayings are unmistakeably
reflective of the passage of time since the presumed period of Jesus,
even in those assigned to him, such as Matthew 11:23, based on Q: "From
the days of John the Baptist until now..." Can this be referring to a
matter of months? No, it is a saying when first formulated which
reflected the community looking back over its history, something
artifically placed later in an artificial Jesus' mouth. Is the
Temptation story something that would have arisen in Jesus' lifetime? Q
is full of indicators like this which reveal much about its nature, its
history, what its reputed founder was and what he was not. Finally on the
matter of Q, Licona again shows a limited understanding of the
situation: Moreover, if Mark used Q as one of his
sources, we must ask how we may detect this in his Gospel. After all,
scholars identify Q by tradition common to Matthew and Luke but not
found in Mark! Thus, Doherty's argument that Mark combined Q and Paul
does not make much sense. "Q" is a
document hypothesized through extraction from Matthew and Luke (a quite
valid process). But this document makes best sense when seen as the
product of a community. We can identify themes of that community from
the sayings and anecdotes. The itinerant lifestyle of its apostles, the
expectation of the Son of Man, the performance of miracles as
harbingers of the Kingdom, its view of John the Baptist as its mentor,
and so on. These general themes are found in Mark. It is clear that the
communities of Mark, Matthew and Luke are rooted in the same general
Kingdom-preaching movement, which may have spanned several decades and
a wide area of Galilee and Syria. What Mark did not have was a specific document
from which all the specific sayings found in Matthew and Luke were
drawn. This is why Mark contains none of them, and is in fact quite
threadbare on sayings in general. Q must have seemed a goldmine to the
authors of Matthew and Luke, and it may have provided the main impetus
for them to do their own revisions to Mark, incorporating the content
of Q. One of the
great stumbling blocks for historicity in the New Testament epistles is
Hebrews 8:4. I
will quote three different translations of this verse: - NEB: "Now if
he had been on earth, he would not even have been a priest, since there
are already priests who offer the gifts which the Law prescribes." I will start
by repeating
what I have often said elsewhere. The verb which is translated above as
either "were" or "had been" is ēn,
the imperfect tense of "to be." It is sometimes debated as to whether
the imperfect in a contrafactual situation must have a present sense,
or whether it may also refer to the past (as the NEB renders it), but
this
is what one scholar, Paul
Ellingworth (Epistle
to the Hebrews, p.405), has to say: “The second difficulty concerns the meaning of the two occurrences of ēn. The imperfect in unreal conditions is temporally ambiguous, so that NEB [New English Bible] ‘Now if he had been on earth, he would not even have been a priest’ (so Attridge) is grammatically possible. However, it goes against the context, in at least apparently excluding Christ’s present ministry, and it could also be misunderstood as meaning that Jesus had never ‘been on earth’.” I'm always
happy to quote Dr. Ellingworth, as one can imagine. Having laid that
groundwork, let's see how Mike Licona handles the affair. Licona
declares he is going to look at the "context" of this verse. But his
concept of context is to randomly pick other verses in the epistle,
draw conclusions from them individually, and then claim that they cast
a certain light on the verse in question. My concept of context
addresses what is being laid out, and argued, in the immediately
surrounding passage of which this verse forms a part. We must analyze
it
in the context of what the passage itself is saying. Part of
Licona's context, for example, is 7:14, which has nothing to do with a
discussion of sacrifices, which is what chapter 8 and 9 are all about.
It assigns "the Lord" to the tribe of Judah, but this is almost
certainly derived from scripture, which is where the writer draws all
of his data about Jesus throughout the epistle. (I'll touch on this
again when dealing a little later with Licona's examples in Hebrews of
"Jesus as one who lived on earth.")
Licona then points to a later verse
(7:27) which states the fact of Jesus' sacrifice. Finally, 8:1 says
that Jesus has taken his seat at the right hand of God. From this
"context" Licona draws the progression: life on earth...death/sacrifice
on Calvary to inaugurate a new covenant... ascension to heaven where he
now serves as our priest. 8:4 is thus to be interpreted this way: In context, the author of Hebrews is
saying that if Jesus had continued to be on earth rather than going to
heaven, he would not be serving as a priest as he now does. The context as
Licona has constructed it is one of his own making. First, it must be
established that 7:14 refers to an historical, human descent from the
Judah tribe, and this Licona simply assumes because for him (and for so
many others) it sounds like it. Second, Hebrews has not a word to say
about Calvary, about a sacrifice on earth. For this epistle, the
"sacrifice" is an act that takes place in heaven, as the context of
chapters 8 and 9 clearly shows. It is the act of Christ bringing his
own blood into the heavenly sanctuary and offering it to God; the
preceding death, when or where it has taken place, is never mentioned
or factored into the equation in any way. Hebrews' Jesus is a "High
Priest" precisely because of this heavenly act, he is a priest in terms of it. We'll come back to
this. The writer of
Hebrews never states, or even intimates, that Christ went from earth to
heaven at any point. This implication is read into the epistle on the
basis of a couple of verses elsewhere which 'sound like' earthly
experiences, such as 5:7 or 10:5. (Again, we'll consider these
shortly.)
But since all these verses show that their basis is scripture and not
historical tradition, and since the kind of thinking in evidence
throughout the epistle, including every aspect of the presentation of
Jesus' sacrifice, is solidly in terms of Middle Platonic philosophy of
higher and lower worlds, there is no basis (other than the simple
assumption of orthodoxy) to impute an earthly life for Hebrews' Jesus.
Thus Licona's progression from earth to heaven is without foundation. Would Licona's
analysis of 8:4 make much sense if we were to accept his progression?
Not much, or none at all. What would be the point of the author saying
this? Part of the problem is Licona's shallow understanding of the term
"priest." He simply takes it in a general way, as though one might
refer to the priest of one's parish, taking care of our souls, praying
to God for us, and perhaps keeping the candles lighted. But Hebrews is
far more sophisticated than that. Jesus is a High Priest, the spiritual
equivalent to the high priest on earth. He is a High Priest in that he
performed the heavenly (Platonic) equivalent of the act which the
earthly high priest performs, namely bringing the blood of the
sacrificed animal into the inner sanctuary and offering it to God. In
Jesus' case, it is his own blood; he is the sacrificed entity. It is
this high priestly act, taking place entirely in heaven, which mediates
the new, better covenant. It is better because it takes place in heaven, "in a more perfect tent,
not made by men's hands, that is, not belonging to this created
world..." (9:11; cf. 9:24 and 8:5). This Platonic dichotomy saturates
the philosophical picture presented in Hebrews, and is absolutely
undeniable (though there are those, from apologists to Bernard Muller,
who refuse to see it). With this
context laid out, Licona's statement of what is meant by 8:4 simply
doesn't work. I'll repeat it: In
context, the author of Hebrews is saying that if Jesus had continued to
be on earth rather than going to heaven, he would not be serving as a
priest as he now does.
In any
context, this would leave us scratching our heads. The statement per se makes sense, but what does
it tell us? What purpose does it serve, especially in relation to any
argument being made in this passage? Of course if Jesus had stayed on
earth he wouldn't be a priest in heaven. What's the point of saying
that? Indeed, the very idea that Jesus would stay on earth has no
relevance. What if someone said, "If Jesus hadn't sacrificed himself we
wouldn't be saved." Of course. That's evident. But why bother to make
such a statement? What purpose would it serve? At first
glance, the sentence as it stands in 8:4 may seem trivial, but it makes
a point relevant to the argument, it makes sense in relation to the
issue being discussed. And it serves to introduce the basic difference
and
separation of the two kinds of high priest, heavenly and earthly. In
verse 3, he has just said: "Every high
priest is appointed to offer gifts and sacrifices: hence, this one too
must have something to offer...." Note that this is a general statement; it applies to all times. There has no particular relevance to the past as opposed to the present, or vice-versa. The writer is starting to focus on the different types of high priest and the different types of sacrifices they are each appointed to make; he specifically states that Jesus ("this one") has his specific sacrifice. He is about to introduce a dichotomy, the difference between the high priests on earth and Jesus the heavenly High Priest, and their respective sacrifices. What is the first thing he now says? He says 8:4: "If he were on earth he would not be a priest, for there are already men who offer the gifts prescribed by the law." So the basic
aspect of his dichotomy, the idea he places first, is that (however you
want to phrase it, whatever tense you want to understand) Jesus as High Priest does not function on
earth. The earthly high priests fill that role. This is not a
case of past or present. It is a general state of affairs. (Which, as
Ellingworth acknowledges, fits the ambiguous nature of the imperfect ēn perfectly.) Jesus' sacrifice,
and his act as High Priest, takes place in a different venue, namely
heaven. Verse 4 leads onward to verse 6, which, after the point being
made that the earthly high priests "minister in a sanctuary which is
only a copy and shadow of the heavenly" (a Platonic principle he
supports from scripture), says: "The ministry
which has fallen to Jesus is as far superior to theirs as are the
covenant he mediates and the promises upon which it is legally secured." Supported
by
further statements in later verses (such as those I mentioned above,
9:11 and 9:23-24), this is clearly presenting a High Priest Jesus who
operates exclusively in heaven. Earth is the earthly high priests'
territory, and heaven is Jesus' territory. Jesus doesn't operate on
earth because he would have nothing to do there; that's where the
earthly high priests function. Claiming that this
mutual exclusivity only applies to the present and not to the past
makes no
sense whatsoever; it would be trivial, indeed completely pointless, to
note this separation of territory for today, when the separation
would not have existed at the time of Jesus' incarnation on earth
when Jesus' death and priestly sacrifice actually took place there. It may seem a
little
peculiar on the writer's part that he began with the thought, "If he
were on earth...", but that was simply his way of introducing the idea
that it is the earthly high priests who are appointed to perform the
earthly
sacrifices; he is simply adding the thought that a Jesus on earth
(which he
never was, the writer is saying, only if
he had been—the thought
is contrafactual) would have had no part in them and
thus would have had no scope to perform as a priest. The thought would
be true at any time, past or present. Note that he is not simply saying
that Jesus wouldn't have taken part in the earthly high priest's
duties; he is saying that he would
not have been a priest at all. His appointed sacrifices (which
render him a priest) do not belong
to earth. That is what he says repeatedly throughout these
chapters. And for the writer to say all this would be impossible—let me repeat:
impossible—if Jesus had
been crucified and resurrected on earth, since it would be impossible
not to regard such actions as at least part of Jesus' act of sacrifice,
and this would contradict his careful and adamant separation of the
roles and acts of the earthly vs. the heavenly high priests into their
two respective territories. (Indeed,
it might be said that Hebrews could only have been conceived and
written in the context of the Jesus Myth theory. One of the vexing
questions for scholars has always been the who, why and how. Why would
any Christian group associated with the faith movement about an
historical Jesus, presumably taught and accepting a certain
soteriological kerygma based on Calvary and the resurrection from the
tomb, have come up with this radically eccentric presentation of Jesus'
sacrifice in heaven, based on esoteric uses of scripture and ancient
cultic practice, with no referent whatsoever to the earthly hill and
gravesite? I suggest that they are correct to find it unexplainable
(nor has it been explained by
any commentator). I suggest that a writer or community with Calvary and
the tomb staring them in the face simply could not
have been led to create the mystical otherworldly scenario of Hebrews,
one entirely inhabiting the inner hothouse world and mythical dimension
of scripture. From its opening verses to the final "Amen" (the
remaining four verses have undoubtedly been tacked on later to turn
this theological treatise into a letter), this writer does not live in
the real world. This is Platonic Judaism as much divorced from reality,
or any link to it, as an asylum. And while this is perhaps the most
extreme case in the New Testament, so much else in the epistles, and
Revelation, echoes the same scripture-based metaphysical atmosphere,
with little or no relevance to the everyday world. I suggest that such
writers and apostles could immerse themselves in such a dimension only
because their faith had no connection to a real-world event or figure.
It was all a product of their own minds, their own relevations, their
own fevered study of scripture....And I would also suggest that
continuing to insist in our modern scientific age on interpreting
reality according to those minds and those scenarios threatens to
compromise our own sanity.) The earthly
high priest performs his sacrifice with the animal's blood in the
earthly tabernacle; Jesus the High Priest performs his, involving his
own blood, in the heavenly tabernacle. The author is not only comparing
the two as higher/lower, heavenly/earthly, counterparts in Platonic
fashion, he is declaring Jesus' sacrifice as the superior one, having
superior efficacy. Most important, it has supplanted the earthly ones. Once
this principle is recognized, and it works specifically because one is
on earth and inferior, while the other is in heaven and "better" and
"eternal" (9:23 and 14), everything else falls into place. The essence
of this sect's faith is in this superiority and supplanting. (Remember
the first chapter, devoted to demonstrating the Son's superiority over
the angels, who were the mediators of the old covenant—a
superiority, by the way, entirely 'proven' by appeals to scripture and
nothing at all relating to the incarnated life of the Son.) The old
system isn't needed anymore. Jesus' sacrifice, "once for all" (hapax), unlike the repeated
sacrifices on earth with the inferior blood of animals, has
accomplished salvation and the forgiveness of sin (9:14). Could this
"once for all" sacrifice have been performed on earth? I think I have
already demonstrated the separation of territory which would rule it
out. But let's take a different run at it. First of all, no earthly
dimension to the sacrifice is introduced. There is a passing reference
to "the cross" (12:2), but this is not related to the sacrifice; it is
placed in no historical or earthly setting and
need be no more earthly than any other piece of ancient savior-god
mythology. The sacrifice of Jesus is superior precisely because it
takes place in heaven, because it belongs to a sphere which is the
higher, more perfect counterpart of the high priest's sphere on earth.
Drawing on Paul Ellingworth again (Ibid.,
p.405), he states in regard to the dichotomy between Jesus and the
earthly high priests in 8:4: The argument
presupposes, rather than states, that God cannot establish two priestly
institutions in competition. In other
words, Ellingworth is recognizing that the two classes or levels of
priesthood, the divine and the human, the heavenly and the earthly,
cannot coexist in the same sphere. But this makes no sense in the light
of imposed orthodoxy. If Jesus' sacrifice was seen as in any way taking
place on earth, it would be contravening this stated principle. In an
orthodox context, given all the apparent ambiguity involved in this
passage, an element of confusion would be present which would have to
be clarified, yet the writer offers no clarification at all. He shows
no sign of being aware of any problem. Apologists
like Licona resist the NEB translation because that gives them no way
out. If the writer is referring to the past and declares not only that
Jesus wasn't there, but that he wouldn't have been a priest, then this
has to be seen as destroying historicity, and it contradicts the
presentation of Jesus as a
priest. The only way out is to take it as present: if he were now on earth. But this is not
really a way out, because it leads to a dead end. Why make such a
statement? What would be the point of saying if Jesus were on earth
today he wouldn't be a priest? What could it possibly mean in the
context of the epistle? If the writer is describing an historical event
of the past, portraying Jesus as a High Priest performing a sacrifice
of himself (the first stage of which, on Calvary, was definitely on
earth), what would it mean for him to say that if he were now on earth, he wouldn't—what?
Wouldn't perform his sacrifice? Of course not, that's already been
done. Couldn't serve or be regarded as a priest today, as opposed to
yesterday when he could? None of it makes sense. An exclusively
present sense for this statement in 8:4 has no meaning at all, no
purpose at all, and would certainly have any reader, ancient or modern,
shaking his or her head in confusion. I have never seen any commentary
on this passage that grapples with, or even recognizes, the anomalies
contained in it, let alone remotely offers a way to make sense of it
along orthodox lines. Most often, it is simply glossed over. It takes a
lot of concentration to ignore a smoking gun at a crime scene, but the
vast number of detectives who have investigated Hebrews have managed to
do just that. Verse 8:4 is
itself a declaration that the acts of Jesus as High priest cannot take place on earth, that
his sacrifice is not an earthly one. If it were, if it could, then
there would be no conflict with the duties of the high priest of the
Temple (or at Sinai, which is where Hebrews' earthly 'action' is located—again,
an
example of its whole thought and argument being based in scripture).
They could both do their own respective thing in the same sphere. 8:4,
however, says the opposite. If an attempt
is made to split the sacrifice hair and say that the crucifixion
itself, the producing of the blood, took place on earth, but the
bringing of the blood into the heavenly sanctuary is treated separately
as the "sacrifice" act, one might get part of a foot in the door.
Jesus is not High Priest in regard to the Calvary event, dying on the
cross, but only in regard to the heavenly segment, since this and only
this is what constitutes being the heavenly High Priest. But the door
is still stuck. Because this renders the 8:4 idea contradictory. If
Jesus is by definition only High Priest when he's in heaven and not on
earth, then 8:4 becomes inapplicable, no matter whether past or
present; the thought would be irrelevant, and the author would have no
logical or necessary reason to say it. I have offered
other discussions about Hebrews 8:4 in previous website articles, and
would refer the reader to them if interested (Article No. 9: A Sacrifice in Heaven, and toward the end of my Comment on Richard Carrier's review of The Jesus Puzzle, as well as the Hebrews file in my Sounds of Silence feature),
although the present one is fuller and essentially supplants them all.
I submit that 8:4 spells out that Jesus was not, and never had been, an
earthly figure. Licona, as do
so many others, points to various
references elsewhere in the spistle which sound like they are talking
about a Jesus on earth. Rather than add to the material here (and make
this article totally unwieldy), I will refer the reader to the above
mentioned Article No. 9, which discusses those passages at length.
(Hebrews 7:14 is discussed in Article No. 8, Christ As "Man" under the
heading "Sprung From Judah.") Here, I will simply make the point that
in most cases, it will be seen that the author makes those statements
because he is reading them out of scripture; 10:5 most clearly shows
that scripture is regarded as the embodiment
of the Christ myth, that the "through the Son" spoken of in 1:2 is the
perceived voice and channel of the Son in scripture,
not on earth. Not a
single saying of Jesus is provided in this epistle, not even when
several would have been available to make the writer's point, such as
in chapter 2 concerning the Son regarding all men as his brothers. And
when the Son is "for a short while made lower than the angels," or when
he is "made like his brothers in every way," Licona ignores the
available Platonic interpretation of such ideas, the counterpart,
homologic relationship between heaven and earth, and that of the
descending god who
takes on human-like forms and is crucified in a heavenly sphere that
was indeed lower than that of the angels. (The very concept of reading
Christ out of scripture, a window onto the spiritual reality, is also
an expression of Platonic philosophy.)
It's an interpretation that fits very well with the total content of
the epistle, which never breathes a word of a human Jesus of Nazareth
or a life beginning in Bethlehem and ending on Calvary. The One Who Is To Come My second
"smoking gun" (or perhaps the second bullet of the same weapon, as
Licona puts it) is Hebrews 10:37. Here it is in a literal translation: For yet in (a)
so so little (time), the coming one [ho
erchomenos] will come and will not delay; but my righteous one
will live by faith, and if he shrinks back, my soul will not be pleased
with him. Licona accuses
me of "not bother[ing] to read the
context." Nor am I familiar with the
ancient Christian belief that Jesus would return from heaven very soon.
(Hmmm, I wonder how I missed that?) Well, it is apparently Licona who
is not
familiar with the context, and what the above passage constitutes. It
is a quote of Habakkuk 2:3-4 (the Septuagint version). The prophet, at
the behest of God, is to write down that the "coming one" is
coming soon, wait for him. As I said in The Jesus
Puzzle (p.50): The prophet
was referring to God himself, but by the Christian period this was one
of those many biblical passages reinterpreted as referring to the
Messiah. Indeed, the Greek participle erchomenos,
which the Septuagint employs, became a virtual title, used with a
masculine article, "the Coming
One," and referred to the expected savior figure who would arrive at
the End-time. Hebrews is clearly using it as a reference to Christ. So the
"context" is not one involving the belief that Jesus would return from
heaven very soon, since it is a quote of a prophet who lived centuries
earlier. Since there is no suggestion here or anywhere else in Hebrews
that Jesus is a figure who would "return" from heaven, Licona has
created his own context, formed by reading the Gospels into the
epistle, something that is the prime methodology of apologists
everywhere and at all times for close to two millennia. As I pointed
out in regard to this passage, the writer employs Habakkuk's prophecy
without qualification. The words, and the prophet's intention, say that
the "Coming One" (the Messiah, or God himself, or some other End-time
apocalyptic figure) will come soon. Not "return." Not "again." Since
both writer and reader would have been well familiar with this
prophecy, they would know its associations; that is, they would know
that it referred to a figure who was to come in the future, a figure
who had not already been to
earth. To use it without qualification, without clarifying that this
Coming One had recently been here,
so that this was a second coming, would have gone against the grain. It
is, of course, not impossible that someone could use this quote and
understand it in a new context without spelling things out, but the
point is, to simply claim that this is so is bringing an assumption to the text which cannot
be demonstrated. If taken in straightforward fashion (i.e., without
begging the question), one has to accept that the direct implication of
the passage is that, like Habakkuk, the writer is declaring that the
expected Coming One is due to arrive soon and has not already been here. I am surprised
that Licona did not appeal to another verse in this epistle, 9:27-28,
which is claimed to be the only passage in the entire epistolary corpus
which specifically says that Jesus will come a "second" time. However,
there is another way to translate the key words (ek deuterou): as "next," which is
actually to be preferred since it fits the parallel the writer has
created between verses 27 and 28. For a fuller discussion of this, see
the Epilogue to my Article No. 9: A
Sacrifice in
Heaven, where 10:37 is also discussed. If Licona
wants context, he should survey all the references in all the epistle
writers to the expected "coming" of their Christ Jesus. Not a single
passage contains any suggestion of a return. Indeed, the sentiments
strongly convey that this is the first time anyone will be seeing him.
Here are a few (from the NIV): - Philippians
3:20: "But our citizenship is in heaven. And we eagerly await a Savior
from there, the Lord Jesus Christ." Denying the Faith Licona devotes
a short paragraph to my second "smoking gun," namely Minucius Felix. As
the reader may know, I have lately devoted more words to this
single document than just about anything else in the entire record. I
don't
intend to repeat them here, but will refer the reader to other files.
Licona is in over his head here, since his brief retort doesn't seem to
be able to grasp, or express, the issue: [After enumerating the pagan list of
horrific accusations against the Christians] "...[Felix] adds, "For in
that you attribute to our religion the worship of a criminal and his
cross, you wander far from the neighbourhood of the truth, in thinking
either that a criminal deserved, or that an earthly being was able, to
be believed God." In other words, Felix says that Christians neither
worship a criminal nor his cross. For a criminal is unworthy of worship
and an earthly being cannot be thought of as God..." Exactly.
Licona has stated the case against Minucius Felix being an orthodox
Christian. Felix denies the accusation that Christians (or at least, proper Christians according to his circles of Christianity)
worship a criminal (the crucified man) and his cross, and the reasons
he gives for not doing such a thing are because a criminal is unworthy
of worship and an earthly being cannot be thought of as God. He's
denying the accusation. It's false to say that Christians do so, and
this is why. What every apologist and commentator has done with this
passage is read the opposite into it: Oh no, we do worship this man and his cross,
but that's because he wasn't a criminal and he wasn't an earthly being.
But these statements are not in the text. They are not even implied in
the text. In fact, what he subsequently says on both counts, what can
be found in the surrounding context, illustrates that the worship of
man and cross is denied, pure and simple, that the accusation of such
worship is regarded and treated in the same vein as all the other
reprehensible accusations. Licona
concludes: "...By no
means is Felix saying that Christians believe Jesus was a criminal or
that he was merely a human—or that he never existed." That's not the
issue. Felix does not directly pronounce on whether the the man in
question was a criminal, although his words seem to suggest that he
accepts the designation, and it is certainly clear he assumes the man
was human. In any case, he also does not pronounce on the question of
whether he thinks the man existed or not. This is not his point. He may
be aware that some groups, as
the accusation infers, do in fact worship a crucified man and his
cross, but this is not entirely clear. His bottom line is to deny the
appropriateness of such a practice, which he does in no uncertain
terms. But if any apologist, representing any group calling itself
"Christian," could deny and denigrate the worship of a crucified man as
part of his faith, this virtually rules out that the movement (which
was a wildly diverse and uncoordinated one during the first two
centuries) could have begun with such an event and such a belief. That
is what makes this passage in Minucius Felix a "smoking gun." For those
wishing to go into depth on this question, I refer them to the two
parts of my Response to GakuseiDon: CritiquesGDon
and CritiquesGDon-2, and my
follow-up debate with him on the Internet Infidels Discussion Board: DebatesFelix. The latter contains two
postings in particular (#3 & 4) which I consider incisive. * There
are other things in Licona's critique which merit rebuttal, but which I
will leave to others: such as his arguments against Flemming in regard
to opinions about religion and the harm it has caused, against Richard
Carrier in regard to evidence for the validity of atheism and his
analysis of the Gospel of Mark, and most of all against Richard Dawkins
wherein Licona supports creationism and speaks of the "flaws" in
evolutionary theory, backed, of course, by "a list of more than 400 scientists."
Here, he indulges in that reprehensible and dishonest practice which is
endemic to anti-evolutionists: taking quotes from (truly) leading
scientists out of context, so that it looks like they are denying or
expressing deep misgivings about evolution itself, when they are doing
nothing of the sort. I would recommend to the reader the latest issue
of "Skeptical Inquirer" (Nov-Dec 2005), devoted in large part to
"Evolution and the ID Wars." One of the articles, "Why Scientists Get
So Angry When Dealing with ID Proponents" by Jason Rosenhouse, is
devoted to exposing what the writer calls a shameless and maliciously
misleading practice. In his
wrap-up, Licona speaks of the historian making historical decisions,
and asks: - Which explanation accounts for all of
the facts? To
me, his answer boils down to "the explanation that we are all familiar
with, that has been accepted for the longest time, by the greatest
number of scholars, the one that puts the least strain on our
traditions, our sensibilities, our faith." I prefer to put it
differently: - How much in
the early Christian record outside the Gospels (and even within) is
inconsistent with an historical Jesus? My
work, and that of others, has been to demonstrate that the principle of
consistency rules in favor of Jesus mythicism, that it best, and
without strain, solves the problems inherent in the old paradigms, and
accounts for the great variety of features we find in
the record of the first two centuries, especially when taken in
conjunction with the beliefs and philosophies of the time. (As Richard
Carrier
has put it, it wins the Argument to the Best Explanation.) The Jesus
Myth theory forms a coherent whole, all its parts complement one
another, and nothing is ad hoc. In contrast, the claim for an
historical Jesus must deal with a host of inconsistences, missing
elements, contradictions and absurdities. Apologists don't have enough
fingers to plug all the holes in the dyke, and they are constantly
scrambling to explain this or that problem, this or that incongruity,
this or that piece of contrary evidence, and mostly in ad hoc fashion.
From the apologetic point of view, if Christianity is true, let alone
the word of God, this situation should not exist; certainly the record
should not be as chaotic and problem-ridden as it is. No mythicist I am
aware of has ever claimed ironclad proof. What I claim is "balance of
probability" when a dispassionate, un-predisposed, non-confessional
survey of the evidence is undertaken. Which leads me
to my final section.... Denying the Jesus Myth
Theory If
there is
one "argument" that apologists, especially amateur ones, use the
most, it is the "appeal to authority." The vast majority of New
Testament
scholars of every sort accept that Jesus existed, and thus it's a slam
dunk. I don't need to detail why that majority exists; it is simply a
given in the field, a field populated by believing Christians and those
who have invested their careers in the existence of such a man. (I
am not saying that such people are incapable of logical thought, simply
that they have an inbuilt bias which can make them unwilling to
exercise it.) But
the argument goes further than that, and Licona appeals to this too: While professional scholars have paid
no attention to Doherty's work, they have certainly responded to the
hypothesis he proposes, namely, the idea that Jesus never existed. And he gives
us examples of that "response" (I'll deal with Michael Grant
separately): - Gunther Bornkamm: "to doubt the
historical existence of Jesus at all...was reserved for an
unrestrained, tendentious criticism of modern times into which it is
not worth while to enter here." The problem
is, such responses are not critiques. They are little more than
declarations of faith, offended at the very idea being proposed. Maier
is practically foaming at the mouth. (Ironically—but revealingly— the
one
atheist in the bunch, Michael Martin, is the only one to make an
unemotional, non-judgmental comment.) They in no way address the
arguments of the mythicist case. This is not scholarship, or an appeal
to scholarship, since none is presented. It is certainly not neutrality
or the scientific approach to a thesis, and any spirit of inquiry is
lamentably lacking. With one or two exceptions, the few scholars over
the years who have actually produced a
critique (it is usually a chapter in a book, if that), do not deal with
the subject in any depth; they show little understanding of the extent
and multi-faceted nature of the mythicist case, and they all regularly
recycle the same old
weak and timeworn objections that mythicists have long answered. As
well, a good
number of these critiques are quite dated, written before the recent
advances
in New Testament scholarship at the mainstream level: insights into the
nature and content of Q, the pervasive extent of midrash found in the
Gospels, revelations provided by the Nag Hammadi documents and new
studies of the Jewish Pseudepigrapha. The mythicist case over the last
ten years (including from myself and Robert Price, both "amateur" and
"professional" if you like) has kept pace with these developments and
discoveries, but there has been no fresh attempt by historicists to
defend against it. The allegation that scholarship has dealt adequately
with
the Jesus Myth theory, much less that it has demolished it, is
poppycock.
The claim revolves like an echo around a circular chamber. No one knows
who started it or whether it has any substance. Consider Michael Grant,
whom Licona quotes: "To sum up,
modern critical methods fail to support the Christ-myth theory. It has
'again and again been answered and annihilated by first-rank scholars'.
In recent years 'no serious scholar has ventured to postulate the
non-historicity of Jesus'—or at any rate very few, and they have
not succeeded in disposing of the much stronger, indeed very abundant,
evidence to the contrary." This quote is
from Grant's Appendix (p.200), wherein he devotes two paragraphs to the
question. He wrote in 1977, which is not only before those
advances in
New Testament scholarship I spoke of, but before a few of those
rebuttals modern defenders of Jesus like to point to for their claim of
demolition. On the latter, I quote from my Postscript article: Something like The Evidence for Jesus (1986) by R. T. France, Vice-Principal of the London Bible College, hardly fills that role, and is devoted to illuminating the figure of an historical Jesus—a largely orthodox one—not just to defending his existence. As a defense it is quite ineffectual, taking no account (since it largely predates them) of recent insights into Q, the pervasive midrashic content of Mark, the modeling of Mark's passion story on the traditional tale of the Suffering Righteous One, and much else that has given ongoing support to the no-Jesus theory. Graham Stanton, in his The Gospels and Jesus (1989), devotes a chapter to addressing the views of mythicist G. A. Wells. Stanton's 'case' against Wells' position is little more than a citation of Josephus, Tacitus and Pliny, and an appeal to the authority that comes with the majority's acceptance "that Jesus existed." Ian Wilson, in Jesus: The Evidence (1984), does much the same, first acknowledging the uncertainty and contradiction in the early evidence, and then having recourse to the same trio of ancient 'witnesses.' All of them raise points that show little or no understanding for the depth and sophistication of the mythicist position.... Getting
back
to Michael Grant, on what basis then does he make his 1977 comment, "it
has again and
again been answered and annihilated by first-rate scholars"? Who
are these scholars? He doesn't say. In fact, he is merely quoting the
opinions
of others here who predate himself by one or two decades. But we have
to go back into the
early 20th century to find anyone who could possibly fill the bill, the
most extensive being Maurice Goguel who defended the existence of Jesus
in Jesus the Nazarene: Myth or
History (1926).
In some cases Goguel's arguments are reasonably
competent, but always answerable; in other cases, they can be naive in
the extreme, arguing from assumptions that are locked into the
historicist paradigm, making his methodology circular; I doubt that the
mythicist case even in that period could not have pointed such
weaknesses out. To think that Goguel in any way serves to derail modern
Jesus mythicism is laughable. Others before Grant's time include
authors who wrote in 1912, 1914 and 1938, hardly giants in their field
or playing with a modern deck. Thus, Grant is simply blowing smoke in
repeating the claim of "time and time again" and "annihilation." Where
is the
"abundant evidence to the contrary"? Doctored passages in Josephus
(whom, by the way, Goguel regards as unreliable,
like most scholars of
his era)? Second century Tacitus? Or perhaps the great wealth of
unmistakeable reference to an historical Jesus in the non-Gospel
documents. And yet these are precisely the sort of comments that are
passed around like holy scripture, that form a kind of "appeal to
authority" in themselves. They are based on a chimera. The only way
modern mainstream scholarship is going to prove its case against the
Jesus Myth theory is to present it. It has to stop claiming victory
based on nothing, stop burying its head in the sand, stop choking on
its own ad hominem insults against a proposition that has been
frequently, competently, and honestly presented for well over a
century. If it is
so deficient, so bizarre, so insane, it ought to be an easy task. On the other
hand, if Mike
Licona's critique is any indicator of the proof that can be mounted, it
is going to be anything but
an easy task. *
* * A week before
this response to Mike Licona was completed, I posted the following on
the Internet Infidels Discussion Board. It speaks for itself:
Earl Doherty |