Quote:
|
Since you think that I am giving a "black is
white" spin on this, I'd like you to clear this up. You are saying that
M Felix dismisses the man and also his cross; the latter because it is
unimportant. |
Well, of course, the words and phrases in bold can
be said to be
“positive” in
nature, per se. Highlighting the words “swelling” and
“expanded” as
having some relevant positive significance is certainly reaching a bit,
but
this actually epitomizes the atomistic approach: if it sounds in any
way
supportive, or fitting the desired meaning, take it and claim that it
supports
one’s case. The proper question is, how do these phrases and sentiments
relate
to the statements about the crucified man and his cross? A much more
detailed
and nuanced analysis of what they mean and what role they serve in the
line of
thought one can trace throughout this passage is required before it can
be
declared, based on such phrases, that Felix is speaking in a
positive
fashion about the crucified man and his cross. This is Don’s basic
deficiency, in that he fails to provide this comprehensive and
comprehensible
analysis. In fact, by being atomistic in this way, he has been led down
the
wrong road to the wrong conclusions. This I hope to demonstrate as we
go along.
But let’s start at the beginning. Don tries to claim (and he’s not the
first to
do so) that the way both Caecilius’ accusation and Octavius’ response
are
presented or phrased has certain implications which will enable him to
extract
meanings which are not evidently there at the surface level. This is a
cousin
to atomism, and a common approach to texts in the apologetic field (and
even
scholarship in general). When one doesn’t like what the text seems to
be
saying, force it to be saying something else. Allegorical
interpretation of the
bible, going back into pre-Philonic
Let’s first examine the pagan Caecilius’ accusation in chapter 9. Here,
and
elsewhere, I will use my favorite translation, that of The Fathers
of the
Church (which I referred to in my rebuttal article).
“And anyone who says that the objects of their worship are a man who suffered the death penalty for his crime, and the deadly wood of the cross, assigns them altars appropriate for incorrigibly wicked men, so that they actually worship what they deserve.”
The accusation as stated here is that the
Christians’ objects of worship
include (a) a man crucified for a crime, and (b) the cross itself; the
latter
is hardly the very cross he was crucified on, but the cross as symbol
of the
manner of the man’s death. But something is going on here that has
hitherto
been overlooked. Caecilius sets this accusation in the context of
labeling such
objects of worship (man & cross)—which he metaphorically refers to
as
“altars”—despicable things (implied by “appropriate for” wicked men),
and as
such fitted for despicable people. In other words, the two are alike,
and one
deserves the other. I call this a ‘complementary linking’. It might be
compared
to a modern person claiming that mind-altering drugs are evil, and that
the
people who use them are evil, and thus the thing used and the users
themselves
make a fitting combination, one complementing and deserving the other.
Thus,
Caecilius has offered his accusation by doing two things at once: he
states it
and editorializes it all in one breath..
The same approach first appeared a few sentences earlier, when
Caecilius makes
another accusation:
“I am told that, because of I know not what foolish belief, they consecrate and worship the head of an ass, the meanest of all animals—a religion worthy of and sprung from such morals.”
Again, he is editorializing by offering another
complementary linkage between
the object worshiped and those doing the worshiping: Christians worship
the
head of an ass, which, being the meanest of animals, is a worthy fit
with those
who do so. The two belong together, one complements the other.
Now, Caecilius, even if he is a fictional character created by Felix,
may be
said to represent common pagan thinking about Christianity at the time,
but it
is the author himself who is responsible for the particular words put
into his
mouth and how they are presented in context. Those two examples of the
type of
editorializing I have pointed out (linking the object worshiped and the
people
worshiping it and calling them similar and complementary) are literary
devices, hardly matching the content of actual word-on-the-street
accusations.
The crucified man and his cross being “altars appropriate for wicked
men”
(including the metaphorical use of “altars”) has not been lifted from
common
parlance. That type of subtle commentary is too sophisticated for
general oral
usage or transmission. It can only be a literary twist provided by
Felix. The
matter is clinched by the fact that the complementary linking approach
is
used twice in the same passage, regarding two separate accusations. It
is
impossible that multiple examples of such a sophisticated manner of
expression
would be found in oral usage. Thus, one has every right to conclude
that such
sentiments must reflect Felix’s own attitudes, since he has arbitrarily
inserted them. (This kind of methodological process of identifying a
writer’s
personal imposition of his own—or his community’s—ideas and orientation
on a
passage or tradition, such as in the case of the Gospel evangelists, is
a
common feature of critical biblical research.)
And I might add that since the same device is used in regard to two
different
accusations, the same attitude on the part of Felix must be in common
with them
both. It logically follows that the denigrating attitude clearly
present (and
which no one would doubt) in regard to worshiping the head of an ass
MUST be
present in regard to worshiping the crucified man. In other words, the
alleged
distinction between all those other accusations and the one about the
crucified
man and his cross cannot stand in the face of Felix's identical
editorializing
treatment of both the man and the ass.
So we can further enlarge on one of my regular objections to the
orthodox
spinning of this document, both in the accusation and response
passages. Not
only has Felix included the central and most sacred aspect of his own
faith as
part of a wretched litany whose associations of horror are at the very
least
bound to rub off on it, he offers, in addition, his own editorializing
on the
subject which further compounds the negativity. I maintain that it
would be
impossible for a Christian writer who believed in now-orthodox
doctrines to do
such a thing.
One of Don’s strategies has been to focus on the specific wording of
the
passage in Latin. Literally, it says “those who speak of their
ceremonies (of
worship) (as directed to) a man punished with the ultimate penalty for
(his/a)
crime, and the deadly wood of the cross…” Because Caecilius’ words do
not refer
to the man directly as a criminal, but rather as one “put to death for
a
crime,” this is supposed to remove him in Felix’s mind from any aura of
guilt
or negativity; it is supposed to offer the option that Felix regarded
him as
not actually guilty of the crime. I suggest two things: (1) Caecilius’
words
would be a very (perhaps the most) natural way of referring to a
criminal and
his fate in the context of the idea that he was guilty. Let’s try an
analogy.
“Ted Bundy was put to death for killing two dozen women.” This simply
means
what it says. (Bundy was a notorious American serial killer, executed
about 15
years ago.) It would hardly be anyone’s chosen way to suggest that no
guilt is
being implied, that he was executed on false charges and was not guilty
of the
murders after all. Yet this is what Don would have us believe. If that were
what the writer meant to say or imply, he would certainly have had to
qualify
this statement in a way which clearly stated and demonstrated why Ted
Bundy was
not guilty of such a thing, and why he shouldn’t have been executed
(and why,
moreover, it would be OK to hold him in high esteem when the outside
world is
condemning you for doing so). And (2), in the matter of Felix’s
crucified man,
it would (as we can see by the analogy) be too subtle and obscure to
overcome
the overwhelming negativity and detrimental effect resulting from how
the
accusation has been presented, and how it will be answered.
These things will become even clearer when we move on to the response
to
Caecilius in chapter 29. Since we have introduced Ted Bundy, let’s try
presenting Octavius’ remarks in those terms. I’ll paraphrase the Fathers
translation.
“Moreover, when you ascribe to us the reverencing of Ted Bundy, a murderer of women, you are traveling a long way from the truth, in assuming that a murderer deserved, or that a psychopath could bring it about, to be accorded such reverence. Foolish indeed any group that would give special regard to such a man, when his execution by a justice system that found him guilty demonstrates his clear lack of worthiness and benefit to us.”
What is this analogy saying? That Ted Bundy was
not a murderer? That he was not
a psychopath? Is the person being addressed “traveling a long way from
the
truth” in that Bundy was NOT either of these things? Of course not. And
no one
would take it that way—without some very explicit statement to the
contrary, making
it clear that Bundy did not in fact murder these women and was
wrongfully
executed. Rather, the meaning is that the accuser is a long way from
the truth
in declaring that we reverence Ted Bundy. That is the
most
straightforward and natural interpretation of what is being said. And
it would
be universally so interpreted without some clear and explicit comments
to point
us in a different direction.
Why does the speaker include his comments after “a long way from the
truth”?
Simply as an explanation for why the accuser is wrong in saying we
reverence
Ted Bundy. The speaker is protesting: how can you think that a murderer
deserves such reverence? How can you think it would be possible for a
psychopath to gain that reverence? What fools we would be to reverence
a man
like Ted Bundy, in the face of the sentence meted out to him, for how
could we
appeal to the memory of such a monster and gain any respect or benefit
from it?
Where in this analogy is the qualification, where are the words to
imply that
Ted Bundy was innocent, not a monster, someone worthy of reverence? Of
course,
they are not there. Nor, I maintain, when we switch to the passage in
Felix,
are they supplied in the remarks that follow about the Egyptians, even
by
subtle implication (and in any case, why merely imply, why be subtle?).
But
that part of it is for another day.
So let’s move from Ted Bundy to Octavius’ crucified man.
“Morever, when you ascribe to us the worship of a malefactor and his cross, you are traveling a long way from the truth, in assuming that an evil-doer deserved, or a mortal could bring it about, to be believed in as God. That man is to be pitied indeed whose entire hope rests on a mortal man, at whose death all assistance coming from him is at an end.”
These are the Christian Octavius’ words. They are
certainly blunt. He calls the
man in question a “malefactor” (“criminal” in the ANF). In the next
sentence he
calls him an “evil-doer” and a “mortal”. Why is Caecilius “a long way
from the
truth”? Because no evil-doer deserves to be worshiped; because no
mortal could
get himself to be believed a god. Any person who places his hope in a
mortal is
“to be pitied” because any benefit from him ceases at his death. This
is no
less straightforward and universally interpretable than the analogy
with Ted
Bundy. The language and sequence of ideas is exactly the same. The lack
of any
qualification or statement to point the reader in a different direction
is
equally lacking. Octavius takes over Caecilius' terminology about the
man being
a criminal, with no attempt to soften it. The negative tone and effect
is
identical, if one does not choose to read something into it which can’t
be
found in the words. Yet Don insists on adding a whole new layer of
meaning and
implication: “But it’s OK that we worship this man, because he wasn’t a
criminal and he wasn’t a mere man.” This is asking an awful lot of the
reader’s
intuition and his ability to read between the lines.
Don asks why Felix added those remarks after “far from the truth” if he
didn’t
want to imply something? Why not? They are perfectly natural. They are
not an
implication of anything, they are an explanation of why Caecilius is
wrong.
What was Felix/Octavius to say? “No, we don’t!”? That wouldn’t get him
very
far. Maybe, “Ah, yer muther duz too!” Perhaps he might have said, “Come
and see
our ceremonies, and you’ll see that we don’t.” That’s pretty weak, and
offers
no immediate reason for Caecilius to see the error of his accusation.
What
Felix does offer is actually quite powerful, at least to a
rational
person. And it’s philosophical, which is right up Felix’s alley. He has
discredited the accusation in the best way he knows, by showing how and
why the
thought that Christians would worship a crucified man is unacceptable
and
ridiculous—even an “indecency” which has to be defended against, as he
puts it
in his comment immediately preceding, a comment applying to the whole
list of
accusations. He is offering REASONS for his denial: that the criminal
“doesn’t
deserve” and the mortal “isn’t able.” These remarks are in perfect
alignment
with Felix denying the whole idea, especially when they occur in
juxtaposition
with his response to the other accusations, which no one would doubt
for a
moment that he is denying.
Let’s look again at the context, the juxtaposition with those other
accusations. Let’s ask somewhat facetiously, does Felix offer
qualifications in
regard to them? Does he try to explain why it’s OK to reverence the
genitals of
the priests, or maybe that it’s not really the genitals at all, but
only the
priest’s knees? “You wander far from the truth in thinking that it’s
the
genitals we are bowing toward; rather, it’s to those knees on which the
priest
rests when praying to God, which thereby deserve reverence.” Does he
try to
point out that the pagans are misunderstanding the Christian rite of
child
sacrifice, that it’s OK to slay an infant, perhaps because they are
following
God’s original instruction in regard to Isaac and the demand he made of
Abraham?
Naturally these would be ridiculous claims, and Felix does not
try to
excuse the accusations or offer qualifications. The point is, why
include in
this passage something which you would have to claim does need
qualification or excuse, something which is the direct opposite of
those other
accusations? Why offer the accusation about the crucified man in the
same list
as the others if, (1) Felix did not regard them in the same category of
reprehensibility, and (2) he did not want the risk of having the reader
take
them all the same way, a risk that was exceedingly high, if not
guaranteed,
given the manner of his presentation? This aspect of the question is so
blatantly obvious, it amazes me that anyone is incapable of seeing it.
It has
nothing to do with any arguments of mine; it is simply there in the
text
itself.
The only way Felix could extricate himself (and Jesus) from a bad
situation
which has been entirely of his own doing, since he has presented his
material
this way, would be to unequivocally and plainly spell it out. “No, he
wasn’t a
criminal; no, he wasn’t a man; no, this accusation is not like the
others. I
agree that reverencing the priest’s genitals and sacrificing children
would be
utterly reprehensible and I adamantly deny that we do so, but the
accusation
that we worship a man and his cross is entirely different, and I was an
idiot
to include the latter with the others…”
Needless to say, Felix doesn’t do this. And to claim that the remarks
about the
Egyptians serve this purpose is demonstrably false. Such a
demonstration was
provided in my rebuttal article. In fact, I have shown that they serve
to do
the opposite. Rather than rescue the crucified man, they support
Felix’s
condemnation of the accusation. We can revisit that demonstration, as
well as
cover further points such as Felix’s discussion about crosses, though I
won’t
do it in this posting, which has probably exceeded the limit of the
average
person’s attention span (or at least, that was Don’s opinion—I don’t
think I
misread his reference to the aspirin—in regard to the somewhat lengthy
explanation of the smoking gun passages in my rebuttal article). In any
case,
if Don disagrees with that demonstration, then I invite him to do his
own. Let
him trace in detail—not just atomistically lift out certain
words and
phases, as I quoted at the beginning—the connective tissue between the
sentences about the crucified criminal and mortal, through those
referring to
the Egyptians, and show us, not only how my demonstration was
incorrect, but
how the Egyptian remarks can logically be seen as reversing the plain
meaning
of the crucified man remarks.
....But for me, the main point in what you've said here is your use of the word "qualification." I think you are trying to suggest that what Felix says after "you wander far from the truth" is a qualification of the crucified man accusation, meant to discredit or change its meaning. This, of course, is your basic claim in your analysis of this whole passage. But let's break up the passage into its two elements:
A - “Morever, when you
ascribe to us the worship of a
malefactor and his cross, you are traveling a long way from the
truth...
B - ...in assuming that an evil-doer deserved, or a mortal could bring
it
about, to be believed in as God. That man is to be pitied indeed whose
entire
hope rests on a mortal man, at whose death all assistance coming from
him is at
an end.”
B isn't a "qualification" of A (in the sense of discrediting the legitimacy of the accusation), it is an "explanation" of why the accusation is wrong. A paraphrase of both would be:
A - "When you say we
worship a criminal and his cross,
you are wrong...
B - ...because an evil-doer doesn't deserve, and a mortal can't get
himself, to
be believed a god. We'd be fools to have placed our hope in a dead
mortal."
You are trying to see B as meaning: "it's OK to
worship someone whom you
say was a criminal and now dead, because he wasn't a criminal and he
isn't a
dead mortal." That would be a qualification, designed to deny
the
characterization of the man referred to. Again, this requires
subjectively
"reading into" the passage ideas that are not present in the words,
an unjustified reading between the lines. My way of taking it
is much
more straightforward, in that B is an explanation for why the
accusation
is false. We don't do it because...and as I've said, Felix's
explanation is a
rational and compelling one.
If someone said to me, it's rumored you spend all your money on
prostitutes,
and I answered, "You are wrong, no responsible man would consider
prostitutes to be worthy of giving all his money to," would you think
that
I was thereby saying that the women were not prostitutes, but
good women
I was simply dating? That would be pretty obscure. Why would anyone
take it
that way without some direct prompting in that direction, prefereably a
clear
statement that the women weren't prostitutes? So my rejoinder is not a
"qualification" (trying to change or discredit the accusation of
consorting with prostitutes), it is an "explanation" of why you are
wrong to make such an accusation, why the accusation itself is
irrational. It's
irrational, from my point of view, not because the women were not
prostitutes
(which I never say), but because no reasonable man would spend all his
money on
prostitutes (which I do say). And note that I keep referring to the
women as
prostitutes. Let my words mean what they are clearly saying.
....
I think you are not grasping the point of my
discussion about the way Caecilius
(which is to say, Felix, the author) presents the pagan accusation. It
is not
that pagans weren't making the basic accusation itself (that Christians
worship
the man and his cross, or that Christians worship the head of an ass),
it is
that they weren't presenting it in the way that Felix presents
it, the
way he puts it into Caecilius' mouth. The point may be subtle, but it
shouldn't
be that subtle. And I am convinced it's an absolutely crucial
one to
make and to have understood, so I'll spend a little more space on it.
To repeat, Caecilius doesn't merely say that Christians worship a
crucified man
and his cross. That basic part of it would be a reflection of
what is
being said by the pagans. But he also puts it in a certain way. He
gives it an
added dimension, and this is the part that I maintain would not
be a
reflection of what pagans were saying, because putting it this way is
not
something that would arise or spread in oral circles among the hoi polloi. It
has too "literary" a nature, if you like. Let's break the statement
into A and B again:
A - “And anyone who
says that the objects of their worship
are a man who suffered the death penalty for his crime, and the deadly
wood of
the cross,...
B - ...assigns them altars appropriate for incorrigibly wicked men, so
that
they actually worship what they deserve.”
It is B that would
not be found in pagan parlance. That is Felix's own editorializing.
It's too subtle, too sophisticated for an oral setting. First of all,
the use
of "altars" is a metaphor worthy of an imaginative literary
craftsman. But even more polished is the device I've called a
"complementary linking": equating crucified man and cross as being in
the same category as those who worship them. Both are wicked, making
the things
worshiped and the people doing the worshiping equally reprehensible.
For example, if I accuse a group I call backwoods hicks of drinking
homegrown
moonshine which I have characterized as crude and poisonous, and I say
that the
latter is appropriate to the former and those alcoholics drink what
they
deserve, I am quite clearly linking two sides of an equation that are
being
equally denigrated.
Lest one doubt that such an equation is being made by Felix, consider
this. If
the crucified man and his cross, according to Caecilius' words, were
not to be
regarded as wicked, if the man were not to be regarded as an actual
criminal
(not just 'accused' of a crime while really innocent, according to
Don's
attempt to read a fine distinction into things), then the phrase
"appropriate for" would make no sense. If something is appropriate
for wicked men, then that thing must itself be wicked. If despicable
men
worship what they deserve, this is a clear indicator that the thing
they
worship is itself despicable. (The justification for regarding him as
such
would be that he had been a criminal.)
The only way for this device of Felix's presentation to work, is for
both sides
of the link to be viewed in the same way. The man who "suffered death
for
his crime" has to be as much an evil, criminal, wicked entity as the
Christians accused of worshiping him, since he has said that the former
is
"appropriate for" the latter, that the latter "deserve" the
former. To put it another way, if Felix (who created that
editorializing,
complementary linkage, not the pagans) did not in his own mind regard
the
crucified man as a criminal and something despicable, he wouldn't and
couldn't
have fashioned that literary comparison and declared them equal.
And remember, as I pointed out in my last post, Felix has done exactly
the same
thing, made exactly the same kind of complementary equation, in regard
to the
accusation about worshiping the head of an ass. This common
editorializing
approach between the two accusations has to indicate that both
accusations are
being treated the same way, with the same intention to denigrate the
element
involved, crucified man and head of an ass.
Minucius Felix's smoking gun is turning out to be a six-shooter.
Posting #3:
I think a lot of the confusion arising out of what Minucius Felix is saying is due to a lack of understanding of how he fits into the picture of early Christianity, and that’s because most people are still under the influence of the traditional paradigms: that the movement was a single phenomenon (even if splintered, or immediately going off on different trajectories) arising out of some kind of historical figure in Palestine. It misleads us into thinking that there has to be a coherent relationship along those lines between the various communities and expressions represented by the wide range of documents that have come down to us. The whole Jesus Puzzle case is dedicated to showing that this is an imposed view, and that the documentary record shows something quite different. As for Krosero’s remarks, we don’t know whether Felix “doesn’t believe there was any human being at all to begin with.” He’s not clear on that point. He simply wants to deny that proper Christians would do such a thing as worship a crucified man and his cross. If I had to guess, I’d probably put him in the same camp as Tatian, who seems to label such a concept a “story” like the myths of the Greeks.
It is becoming plain to all, I’m sure, that this
debate on
Minucius Felix is spinning its wheels. It has degenerated into
seemingly
endless speculation by the defenders of orthodoxy on what given
passages could
be saying or implying, based on dubious interpretation, the occasional
outright
mistranslation, and simply their own imaginations; such speculations
are then
used as though something akin to established fact. An idea is read into
one
passage and is then claimed to have an effect on another. More
speculation is
offered about the state of Christianity in the larger world of the
period, and
then this is allowed to impose itself on claims of what Felix could or
should
have meant or written. Rarely is the plain meaning of a passage
accepted, or
its context properly taken into account.
Little is to be gained by continuing to pursue the same merry-go-round
of
argument. So I am going to cut to the chase. I am throwing down my own
gauntlet
and challenging Messrs. Don, Ted, Krosero and any others (like Roger
Pearse) to
directly address it. In the course of my contribution here and on my
website, I
offered three observations which I have all but called “foolproof” for
revealing what Felix meant, his personal attitude toward the crucified
man and
his cross. If that is true, everything else is superfluous. Taken
together, I
consider that those three observations make the case irrefutable.
Needless to
say, they have been largely if not completely ignored.
So here’s my line in the sand. We don’t go any further (at least, I
won’t)
until the meaning and implication of these three observations have been
dealt
with thoroughly and honestly, until my analysis has been demonstrated
false and
the conclusions drawn from it invalid. These observations are based
entirely on
the text itself. I will go so far as to say that there is no
speculation
involved, no might’s, no if’s, no could’s, no “readings into” the text,
no
bringing in outside considerations, wider pictures, or
misinterpretations of the
nature of Christianity at that time, and no appeal to what other
authors
allegedly said or meant. This will be a closed laboratory. We will feed
Minucius Felix’s own words, ideas and parallels found in the text
through the
test tube of logical understanding and see what is distilled from it.
You’ve heard all three of them from me before, in separate posts, one
of them
in my website rebuttal to Don, but here I am going to put them under a
spotlight and present them in the clearest fashion I can, undistracted
from any
other material. If anyone thinks they can undermine the legitimacy and
logic of
that layout and interpretation, we will proceed from there.
Number One
The first is in the accusation passage by Caecilius in chapter 9, and I
have
called this feature by the term “complementary linkage”:
[A-] “He who says that the objects of their worship are a man who suffered the death penalty for his crime, and the deadly wood of the cross, [B-] assigns them altars appropriate for incorrigibly wicked men, so that they actually worship what they deserve.”
In my earlier post in which I pointed out this
feature, I presented a principle
familiar to NT scholars. Certain things, such as manner of
presentation, style
of wording, consistent and unique theological content, plot sequences
(as in
the Gospels), etc., can be identified with virtual certainty as the
product of
the writer, and not something he has taken over from oral tradition.
That
principle applies here. The ideas contained in part [B-] of the passage
above
are literary products of Felix, not something that would have been
floating
about in ordinary pagan street parlance. The basic accusation that
Christians
worship a crucified man and his cross are straightforward enough and
represent
pagan impressions, but the rest is too styled and sophisticated, too
literary,
and can thus legitimately be seen as the author’s product. What are
they?
First, the metaphor of “altars” as applied to the man and cross,
second—which
is the crux of the matter here—the “complementary linkage” of the
worshiped
objects (man & cross) with the people doing the worshiping, the
Christians.
The former is “appropriate for” the latter, says Caecilius. In order
for one
thing to be appropriate for another, they must show some common central
characteristic. For X to be appropriate for Y, they must in some key
element be
the same; they are complementary. This element in regard to the
worshiping
Christians, the only element mentioned, is that they are “wicked.” It
logically
follows that wickedness is being assigned also to the objects of
worship, the
man and cross. This is virtually a mathematical equation, and just as
certain.
The final phrase restates the complementary linkage in a different way:
“They
worship what they deserve.” Evil deserves evil. X is equivalent to Y.
Wicked
people deserve to worship wicked things. They can hardly be said to
deserve
good things.
Because those ideas in [B-] are not something which Felix will have
derived
from outside expression (and there is certainly no evidence to show
that they
have been), they are his product. It has already been admitted that the
debate
is a literary device and that Caecilius could well be a fictional
character.
Thus, the author has fashioned Caecilius’ accusation himself and given
it these
sophisticated literary features. Thus they must reflect his own
thinking, not contradict
his own thinking, else he could never have chosen to put things this
way. (This
is supported even further by how he handles Octavius’ response to the
accusation in the later chapter.) The inescapable conclusion is that
Felix
regarded the idea of worshiping the crucified man as reprehensible,
wicked,
deserving of condemnation—just as his words, when plainly read,
indicate. Our
trio of apologists (Don, Krosero and Ted) must demonstrate how this
reasoning
and its premises are incorrect, without bringing in any extraneous and
irrelevant considerations. The above argument is self-contained and
stands on
its own, a rational and inevitable reading of the text. It must be
dealt with
in the same way and within the same parameters.
Number Two
I don’t remember if I’ve given this a term, but let’s call it “parallel
treatment.” In general, of course, I’ve often made the point that by
including
the accusation of the crucified man and his cross in with his treatment
of all
the other accusations, which no one would deny relate to reprehensible
things,
Felix is indicating that he regards them all in the same light. I’ll
repeat
again that he didn’t have to fashion things this way, since he was the
arbiter
of how the debate would be set up, what questions would be dealt with,
the
order they would be addressed and the language brought to them. On this
general
point, no one has yet attempted an effective answer as to why, if he
really
held orthodox views on the crucified man, he would insert it among the
others,
with a commonality of argument and language creating the strong
impression that
he is equally critical of them all. There would have been nothing to
prevent
him from dealing with it separately and creating a far different
impression
than he has.
But there’s more to it than that. It is not just the inclusion itself
of the
crucified man in that list of abominations. I have pointed out that
they are
all dealt with in exactly the same way: similar—even
identical—arguments, similar wording. Let me itemize these features of
Felix’s
response to the several accusations, though I’ll leave the crucified
man until
last. (a) itemizes the content, (b) is the response designed to deny
it, (c) is
the “back-at-ya” accusation against the pagans.
1. WORSHIPING THE ASS’S HEAD:
(a) “Thence arises what you say that you hear, that an ass’s head is
esteemed
among us a divine thing.
(b) Who is such a fool as to worship this? Who is so much more foolish
as to
believe that it is an object of worship?
(c) unless that you even consecrate whole asses in your stables…and
religiously
devour those same asses with
2. THE PRIESTS’ GENITALS (this
one is very abbreviated, but we can
identify the
three features):
(a) “He also who (b) fables [fabulatur] (a) against us about our
adoration of the members of the priest, (c) tries to confer upon us
what
belongs really to himself.” (There follows an account in the Latin of
alleged
licentious practices on the part of the Romans which no translation
I’ve seen
actually translates. The ANF presents the original Latin in its place,
while others
leave out the passage entirely. Victorian sensibilities, extending well
into
the 20th century, one presumes.)
3. SLAUGHTERING AN INFANT:
(a) “Next, I should like to challenge the man who says or believes that
the
rites of our initiation are concerned with the slaughter and blood of
an
infant.
(b) Do you think it possible that so tender and so tiny a body could be
the
object of fatal wounds? That anyone would murder a babe, hardly brought
into
the world, and shed and sip that infant blood?
(c) No one could believe this, except one who has the heart to do it.
In fact,
it is among you that I see newly-begotten sons at times exposed to wild
beasts
and birds…”
4. THE INCESTUOUS BANQUETS
(this one conforms a little less rigidly to
the
pattern, but the elements are still there):
(a) “And of the incestuous banqueting,
(b) the plotting of demons has falsely devised an enormous fable
against us, to
stain the glory of our modesty, by the loathing excited by an
outrageous
infamy...
(c) For these things have rather originated from your own nations.
Among the
Persians, a promiscuous association between sons and mothers is
allowed...”
5. THE CRUCIFIED MAN: Between
Nos. 2 and 3 above, as he has done in
fashioning
Caecilius’ accusation passage in chapter 9, Felix inserts his response
to the
crucified man charge:
(a) “Moreover [Nam], when you ascribe to us the worship of a
malefactor
[hominem noxium: criminal, man guilty of a crime] and his cross,
(b) you are traveling a long way from the truth, in assuming that an
evil-doer
deserved, or a mortal could bring it about, to be believed in as God.
That man
is to be pitied (ANF: “miserable”) indeed, whose entire hope rests on a
mortal
man, at whose death all assistance coming from him is at an end.
(c) I grant you that the Egyptians choose a man for their worship…But
this man…
(I will be examining this passage in more detail as my Number Three
item; here
we can note that it is in the same vein as the other (c) points in the
rest of
the list.)
Thus we can see that in all five cases, Felix’s response pattern and
the nature
of its elements are the same. After (a) itemizing the accusation, he
makes (b)
a scoffing remark about how stupid, foolish, outlandish or outrageous
such an
accusation is, how erroneous (a fable, a lie, a wandering far from the
truth)
it is to think that we are guilty of this, that it is simply not
credible,
followed by (c) the comeback accusation that the pagans are guilty of
doing
those very things themselves. (In all this, the author shows
surprisingly little
imagination; he really is a one-trick pony.)
It should be self-evident that if Felix has imposed the same pattern of
response and ideas on all five, that he means the same thing in all
five cases,
that he has the same attitude—as he has spelled it out—in all five
cases. It is
simply too bizarre to think or to claim that in one of these cases, he
has a
precisely opposite attitude, that he does not intend to heap
scorn on
the accusation that Christians worship a crucified man. If one case
stood out with an opposite meaning for him, he would hardly have
thought, consciously or unconsciously, to treat it with the exact same
response pattern.
No matter how you read (b) in the crucified man case, it is doing the
same
thing as the others, regardless of whether he has opted for a little
different
way of expressing the (b)-type of thought. With the ass’s head, it’s a
straight
scoff: who is such a fool as to worship an ass’s head? That’s all that
is
needed. It’s self-evident in his eyes, he expects it to be so in the
pagan’s
eyes, and it certainly is in ours. In regard to the priests’ genitals,
he’s
even briefer: this is a fable, he says. When he gets to the slaughter
of an infant,
he expresses the same incredulity: how can you believe such a thing?
How could
one possibly be guilty of such an abomination? Regarding the incestuous
banquets, it's a fable, an outrageous infamy. As I said in an earlier
post, he
is reacting to the offensiveness of the activity involved in
the charge.
When he addresses the charge of worshiping a crucified man, he is still
reacting in exactly the same way, but now he adds a nuance to his
standard
(b)-type response. Unfortunately, that nuance has been responsible for
1800
years of misunderstanding, and provided meat for the apologist’s mill.
Instead of
just calling it an insult, or saying something like: how foolish do you
think
we are to worship a criminal and his cross, how could you think we
would do something
like that? he evidently decides that this would not be enough, probably
because
the point isn’t quite as blatantly self-evident as it is in the other
cases.
And so he fashions his (b) to include the reasons why it is
foolish for
anyone to worship a crucified man and for the pagans to think that they
would.
And what are those reasons? Because no criminal would deserve to be
so
worshiped, and no mortal could get himself to be so worshiped. These
are
the reasons why it would be foolish to do so, reasons Felix felt
constrained to supply. It is Felix’s way of highlighting and driving
home his
dismissal of the validity of the accusation.
To our great chagrin (though the passage would probably not have
survived
otherwise, and we wouldn't be here today), what Felix has said also
turned out to create the impression of a
veiled ambiguity, and this is how the passage has been read ever since.
Every
Christian commentator who has read it has chosen to look behind the
lines
and find something that is not there. Felix’s valid and very powerful
justification for regarding the worship of a man and his cross as
foolish and
unthinkable—just as the other accusations are foolish and
unthinkable—has been
turned 180 degrees to mean the opposite. Since Felix declares it is
foolish
because no criminal deserves to be worshiped, lo! this means he meant
to say
that the man wasn’t a
criminal! Glory be! Since Felix declares it is
foolish because a mortal could never get himself to be thought a god,
lo! this
means he meant to say that the man wasn’t a mortal! Hallelujah!
He meant
all this, even though he makes no clear statements to that effect,
something he
could easily have done. This is a totally unnecessary and invalid
imposition of
meaning on the passage, because, as I’ve shown, the other meaning is
there on
the surface, in plain sight, fully understandable. It is fully in
keeping with
the pattern he has established throughout his set of responses. All the
charges
are the same. They are foolish and unthinkable. The only difference is,
in the
case of the crucified man, Felix has expanded his (b) response to show why
it is foolish and unthinkable.
Let’s see if we can draw even more out of that (b) passage, why he may
have
chosen to express such thoughts and what it might tell us. We have all
admitted
that Felix was undoubtedly familiar with sects calling themselves
Christian,
associated with his own by the pagans, who held to a worship of a
crucified man
(probably, by this time, based on the Gospels). Felix thought it was
poppycock,
and could never bring himself to associate it with the faith of his own
group,
his own Logos-belief. Why? For the reasons he states to Caecilius. They
are
clearly emotional reasons, he is viscerally against the thought of
worshiping a
criminal. (If the man was crucified for a crime, then the assumption is
he was
a criminal.) He is against the thought of turning a mortal into a god.
And so
he put those emotional reasons into his response to Caecilius—and there
they
stand, a witness to how some who called themselves Christians would
have no
truck with others of the same name who had adopted doctrines that were
offensive and philosophically repugnant.
(I might point out in passing that the early documentary record shows
all sorts
of examples of this kind of diverse, incompatible, antagonistic
expressions
among the various sects that fall under the general “intermediary Son”
umbrella: Ignatius’ condemnation of those who don’t preach a Jesus
conforming
to his convictions, the author of 1 John referring to certain apostles
whom
some Christians accept into their homes who are nevertheless
“antichrist,” Paul
himself rejecting and condemning other “apostles of the Christ”
as agents
of Satan, masses of heretics and Gnostics and docetists on the second
century
scene, each one a ‘son of Satan’ in the eyes of another. The picture
presented
in Minucius Felix represents another one of these differences, and is
completely understandable in that context.)
Before leaving Number Two, I’ll will point out, as I have before, the
effect
created by the insertion of his general comment after his responses
about the
ass’s head and the priests’ genitals, and before his responses about
the
crucified man, the slaughter of infants and the incestuous banquets:
“These and similar indecencies we do not wish to hear; it is disgraceful having to defend ourselves from such charges. People who live a chaste and virtuous life are falsely charged by you with acts which we would not consider possible, except that we see you doing them yourselves.”
Why he chose to insert this in the midst of his
list instead of before or after
it we don’t know, but the comment cannot be regarded as applying only
to the
preceding cases. It must also apply to those following, since Felix
would have
no reason not to have it refer to the infant slaughtering and
incestuous
banquets charges (it clearly does, and would be covered in his mind by
the word
“similar”), and because those following the comment show the same
pattern of
response as the first two—indeed, they are the same as the comment
itself
reflects, which follows the same pattern of (a) the reference to
charges he
labels as “indecencies”, (b) calling them false and disgraceful, and
(c) the
counter-accusation. He has ipso facto labeled the crucified man
accusation an “indecency” with all the others, “disgraceful” and
something to
be defended against.
This multi-faceted pattern of common, parallel thought imposes its
necessary
meaning on all of the accusations involved: all are to be regarded and
treated
in the same way. To think that Felix would have fashioned his writing
this way
and yet meant something entirely different in regard to the one
accusation,
would be to attribute to him some form of schizophrenia or sheer
idiocy.
Nothing in the document indicates either. It is this principle of
“parallel
treatment” and the conclusion to be drawn from it, that I regard as
undeniable.
It has been done simply through a reading of the text itself,
and thus
it is irrefutable that the author of Minucius Felix rejected the idea
of
worshiping a crucified man and was in no way orthodox in his brand of
Christianity. To dispute this, Don & Co. would have to demonstrate
the
invalidity of my analysis here, not through speculative if’s or
could’s, not by
appealing to extraneous allegations, but by direct examination of the
text and
my contentions about that text. When an equation is demonstrated as
valid on a
blackboard, the student who wishes to dispute it must approach the
blackboard
and use the chalk to demonstrate otherwise, not bring up what the
professor had
for breakfast, or whether the sweater he was wearing might have
affected his
markings, nor appeal to what the student heard or understood about what
some
other professor in a different department wrote on his
blackboard.
Number Three
This has been discussed by many of us in the past, so I’ll reduce it to
its
barest elements.
After (a) itemizing the accusation and (b) giving his reasons for why it is foolish to worship a criminal and put one’s hope in a dead mortal, Felix provides (c) his counter by discussing the case of the Egyptians. What does he say here? He has just expressed the thought that the pagan accusation that Christians worship a crucified man is wrong ("far from the truth"), because no criminal deserves, and no mortal is able, to be believed a god, and foolish is the person who places his hope in such a figure. Then:
“I grant you that the Egyptians choose a man for their worship; they propitiate only him, they consult him on all matters, they slay sacrificial victims in his honor. Yet, though he is a god in the eyes of others, in his own he is certainly a man, whether he likes it or not, for he does not deceive his own consciousness, whatever he does to that of others…”
So far, he has said, ‘Now I know that the Egyptians have chosen to worship a man as a god, but the truth is he is not a god.’ The clear implication here is that Felix disapproves of the Egyptian practice, simply because it’s based on a falsehood and makes a man something he isn’t, and which he knows he isn’t.
“…The same applies to princes and kings, who are not hailed as great and outstanding men, as would be proper, but overwhelmed with flatteries falsely praising them as gods; whereas, honor would be the most fitting tribute to a man of distinction, and affection the greatest comfort to a benefactor.”
Here Felix offers a further example of the
practice of deifying men, in
this
case princes and kings. Again he is disapproving. He states outright
that
“praising them as god” is the wrong thing to do. They should simply be
“hailed
as great and outstanding men.” Enlarging on this last
recommendation, he
says that the best thing to give to “a man of distinction” is “honor,”
and to a
“benefactor” it would be “affection.” (Using the ANF translation Don
prefers, I
would phrase it: the best thing to give to “an illustrious man” is
“honor,” and
to “a very good man” it would be “love”.)
Look at the words, look at the sequence of ideas. Don and others have
completely twisted the meaning and implications of this passage. Felix
is
saying only this: ‘The Egyptians worship a man as a god, but they
shouldn’t;
he’s certainly not fooling himself. One should never turn even princes
and
kings into gods, but instead give them honor and love.’ This is totally
incompatible with the orthodox meaning imposed on the crucified man
remarks:
that the man was not a criminal, that he was not a man but a god and
therefore
it’s OK that we worship him. How is this compatible with Felix then
going on to
say that it is not OK for the Egyptians to worship a man as a
god? How
is the admonition that princes and kings should simply be loved and
honored as
men compatible with the claim that Felix means that the crucified
man was a
god and it is OK to treat him as such? That would make the two elements
of the
passage completely contradictory. Again, Felix would have to be
schizophrenic,
he would have to fail to see the incompatible dichotomy created by what
he has
said. There are no if’s, might’s, or could’s involved here. This is
seeing the
passage for what it says, for the only thing it can be saying.
Appealing to our previous item of discussion (Number Two), if the
passage about
the Egyptians represents the (c) portion of his response to the
accusation,
which it does in conformity to the universal pattern, then it
represents
something he is counter-accusing the pagans of doing, namely worshiping
a man.
Here, as in my discussion of the (b) portion earlier, Felix has added a
dimension of explanation to this comeback: ‘you are the ones who do it
[worship
a man], but you shouldn’t do it, and here’s why.’ If he is
critical of
the practice for the Egyptians and condemns it, then he must be
condemning it
for the crucified man. In this way, it conforms to the “parallel
treatment”
pattern in all the other charges.
Looking at it from another angle, condemning the practice for the
pagans can
hardly serve to imply that it’s OK for Christians to do it. That makes zero
sense. Since the pattern principle demonstrates that Felix is using his
(c) remarks
as a follow-up and aid to the denials in his (b) remarks, then the
passage
about the
Egyptians and princes and kings is logically serving the same purpose
here.
Otherwise, what is he doing? Is this a stream of consciousness writing?
Is
there no internal coherence present or intended by the author? That is
hardly
the case. If he is saying it is not proper to worship men as gods, not
proper
to give them such praise, but only proper to treat them as men, how can
this
serve to turn the crucified man into a god, how can it serve to make it
proper
to worship him, which is what Don and his compatriots are claiming is
the
relationship between the two parts of the passage? It is quite clearly
the very
opposite. He condemns the Egyptians’ worship of a man as an
enlargement on his view that the Christians don’t (or shouldn’t) do so
because
of the reasons he’s given in his (b) remarks. The appearance of a
reference to “a good man” in the (c) remarks is simply a coincidence.
It
serves as
part of the point Felix is making about how one should treat a man as
a man.
It is Don and others who, donning their atomistic hats, have once again
cried
“Hallelujah! This ‘good man’ is a reference back to the crucified man,
and
shows that the alleged criminal was really regarded as good!” At that
point, of
course, the atomistic usage breaks down, because the “good man” has
been
specified as a man, not as a god. But, equally of course, they will
take what
they can get and run with it.
This analysis of the passage, the relationship between the (c) and the
(b) and
how one elucidates the other, is undeniable. It is there in the text.
The marks
are on the blackboard. It, too, is virtually a mathematical equation.
To refute
it, Don or Krosero or Ted would have to demonstrate how my reading of
the
sequence of thought, the content of the ideas, is erroneous and give
us a
better sequence, a better reading of the passage. Place your own marks
on the
board, and do it without speculation, without extraneous “what if’s” or
appeals
to other writers, or any of the other paraphernalia of tactics that
have been
employed.
While it is not a necessary part of my demonstration here, we could
glance at
the subsequent reference to crosses, just to cover all bases. This,
too,
conforms to Felix's regular response pattern. First comes the denial
(b):
“Crosses,
moreover, we neither worship nor wish for.” Then the (c) portion. He
starts out
true to form by accusing them of doing that very thing: “You who
consecrate
gods of wood, adore wooden crosses perhaps as parts of your gods.” Then
he goes
on to broaden the topic and adds several examples of the simple
appearance of
the cross symbol in Roman artifacts, in ships, and in the prayer
stance. These
additions, of course, he is no longer being critical of. His motive for
adding
them is simply to point out that the cross is also a natural and common
phenomenon, perhaps to make the point that Christians would hardly
worship
something so universal. (His point is not completely clear here.) But
the two
together are offered to counter the accusation that Christians worship
crosses,
and they illustrate—again true to the pattern—the (b) statement that
“we
neither worship crosses nor wish for them.” Since all of this makes
logical
sense and consistently shows that the latter phrase means what it says
on the
surface, in plain fashion, there is no reason for Don & Co. to
twist the
whole thing into an opposite meaning. As in the case of the phrase “a
good man”
in regard to the Egyptians, the reference to the prayer stance is
simply
happenstance. Felix has brought it up to serve as one example of the
natural
occurrence of the cross sign, nothing more. It cannot with any logic or
justification be claimed to have some kind of reference back to the
accusation
about the cross, to legitimize it for the Christians or reverse the
plain
meaning of “crosses we neither worship nor wish for.” This is again Don
and his
supporters thinking—and wishfully thinking—under their atomistic hats.
I challenge anyone to demonstrate, with a thorough and logical
explanation we can all understand, that each of these three
observations on the
text is not to be taken the way I have laid them out, and
that—especially when
all three contribute their collective weight—the conclusion I have
drawn from
them is not irrefutable.
*
* *
Further follow-up debates on the IIDB:
To date there has been a further
discussion on the Internet Infidels forum, this one concerning the
document from the Old Testament Pseudepigrapha known as The Ascension of Isaiah. This
Jewish-Christian sectarian document is perhaps the most significant
extant example of the concept of a god descending through layers of a
Platonic universe on a mission of salvation, and places the crucifixion
of "the Son" in the firmament (sublunary sphere) at the hands of Satan
and his evil demons. This picture has been hotly disputed by a number
of Christian apologists on the IIDB, and I offer some of my postings in
that debate here: